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Preface 
 
The square in front of the Parliament House in Canberra is often, understandably, 
thronged with tourists. Gazing towards northeast, the design of Canberra’s urban planners was 
unmistakable—the solemn War Memorial, the grand ANZAC Parade, the modest Old 
Parliament House, and the current seat of the Parliament are perfectly aligned. A symbolic axis 
runs through the centres of all of these structures, joining together a young nation’s history, 
identity, and political life. 
Somewhere along the axis, between the War Memorial and the Old Parliament House, 
there could have been added a soaring, stone-built column. 
But the column, as it is, now stands in a less prominent space on Russell Hill to the east 
of the axis, on the boundary of the ‘Parliamentary Triangle’. Though obscured by the 
eucalyptus from those at the front of both Parliament Houses, it is easily visible from the south 
bank of Lake Burley Griffin and marks one of the tallest points in the city’s skyline. Upon a 
closer inspection, the statue of a bald eagle surmounts the column, rising above all that 
surrounds. It is the Australian-American Memorial. And, despite its appearance, it is not built 
of stone, but aluminium, supported by an internal steel frame. Completed in 1954, the 
Memorial is an emblem of Australian gratitude to their American brethren who had come to 
their aid in the Pacific War. 
Sir Robert Gordon Menzies likely played a part in preventing the column’s addition to 
the nation’s sacred thread. This might seem surprising of a prime minister whose career has 
since been identified closely with ANZUS and the broader developments in Australia-US 
relationship, but according to then British High Commissioner to Australia,  
Mr. Menzies has frequently expressed his dislike of it to me and he claims to 
be responsible for having damned the promoters’ original idea that [the 
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Memorial] might occupy an even more prominent position directly between 
the Australian Parliament and the War Memorial.1 
One wonders if the positioning of the Memorial on the axis would have impressed 
Richard Nixon with Australian friendship even more, when he visited the country in 1953 as 
Vice President of the US. Alternatively, with the column’s construction site being 
conspicuously unavoidable, perhaps it would have made Nixon’s obliviousness even more 
embarrassing.2 Even as the column stands as a reminder of the enduring Australia-US alliance, 
the former’s awkward secret history alerts us to the complexities of the alliance. 
Menzies’ discomfort with the US ran deeper than the siting of a memorial. At the end of 
his first encounter with America in 1935, Menzies recorded this damning judgement in his 
personal diary, which his biographer Allan W. Martin quoted in length 
One thing which impresses the mind is that we err if we regard the Americans 
as our blood cousins. The majority of them are not Anglo-Saxons; their 
appearance is different; their language is by no means identical; their ideas 
are cruder; their standards are lower; they engage in a nauseating mixture of 
sentiment (‘Mother’s Day’) and dollar chasing not palatable to the English 
mind; they have no consciousness of responsibility for the well being or 
security of the world; no sense of Imperial destiny except in terms of 
collaring the world’s trade and washing their hands of world responsibility. 
The best Americans are pathetically conscious of this; they admire Great 
Britain and secretly envy her; the first thing one of them will tell you (if he 
can) is that his uncle or grandfather or mother in law came from the British 
Isles. More and more the minority American—the American who derives 
from before the alien invasion of the twentieth century—turns impatiently 
                                                 
1 Stephen Holmes, report to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 7 April 1954, as cited in 
Allan Martin, Robert Menzies: A Life, Volume 2: 1944-1978 (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University 
Press, 1999), 248. 
2 For Nixon’s 1953 visit, see James Curran, Unholy Fury: Nixon and Whitlam at War (Carlton, 
Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 2015), 3-4. 
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from the racketeering, corruption, violence, intolerance and selfishness of 
contemporary America to look with envious eyes at the quietness, the 
tolerance, the sense of values, the ordered justice, the security of England.3 
It is somewhat understandable, then, that Menzies should feel uncomfortable to have an 
ostentatious totem wedged between the Parliament and the War Memorial, plainly reminding 
him and posterity that his British country was once saved by this ‘alien’ nation. 
It is tempting to interpret this resentment as simply another manifestation of the ardent 
Britishness of Menzies’ generation. But by the time he retired in 1966, Menzies was speaking 
of the relationship between Australia and the US with the greatest warmth. Announcing his 
retirement from the Lodge, he nominated the signing of ANZUS treaty as ‘the best single step 
that had been taken in the time of my Government’.4 While some might dismiss such oratory 
as mere performance of a successful politician masking his private, ‘authentic’ sentiments, it 
is worth remembering that Menzies’ rhetorical embrace of the US was matched by substance—
Menzies’ second term in high office (1949-1966) saw rapid developments in Australia’s ties 
with the US. The ANZUS Treaty was signed, binding Australia into American global alliance 
system; Australian troops joined with their American counterparts in Vietnam War, 
participating in the first major conflict of which Britain was not a part; Australia began 
standardising its defence equipments in line with the US rather than the UK, as well as agreeing 
to host a number of crucial American intelligence installations. Meanwhile, bilateral trade and 
investment boomed. After his retirement in 1966, Menzies took up a position at the University 
of Virginia as a scholar in residence, and made several more trips to the US afterwards.5 
                                                 
3 Martin, Robert Menzies, vol.1 (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1993), 166-167. 
4 Robert G. Menzies (hereafter RGM), ‘Press, radio and television conference given at Parliament 
House, Canberra’, transcript of press conference at Parliament House, Canberra, 20 January 1966, 
online source hosted by Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet of the Commonwealth of 
Australia at PM Transcript: <http://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-1229>, accessed 6 
July 2017. 
5 Martin, Robert Menzies, vol. 2, 546-547. 
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President Nixon, a personal friend of Menzies, invited him to the White House shortly after his 
inauguration in 1969. Perhaps the necessities of the Cold War and the concomitantly increasing 
contact with Americans mellowed this proud Australian Briton’s judgements of the US? If so, 
how? How could Menzies’ scepticism towards America and Americans, so pungently felt 
during his first visit there in 1935, undergo such a profound transformation? 
This thesis investigates Robert Menzies’ attitudes towards the role of the United States 
of America in global affairs. It aims to provide an account for the intellectual trajectory that 
connected the two vastly different sentiments of the same individual. It is a trajectory that 
intertwined with the movements of historical forces during some of the most turbulent times 
of the 20th century. The thesis calls in a range of primary sources, most of which were produced 
by Menzies himself, including speeches, articles, correspondence, diaries, and personal notes. 
A study into Menzies’ views on America is much more than an exercise in scholastic curiosity, 
and, as the following analysis demonstrates, it might prove a useful link in current 
historiography and further our understanding of some of the largest questions in Australian 
political history. What were some of the worldview that informed Australian foreign policy 
during the Cold War? Did Australia redirect its ‘loyalty’ from London to Washington? How 
did the ANZUS treaty, the wording of which did not guarantee any automatic security 
commitment of the signing parties, assume a central importance in Liberal governments’ 
dealings with Washington from the mid 1960s to 1972?6
                                                 
6 From the mid-1960s, Australian ministers and bureaucrats repeatedly sought a clear guarantee from 
the United States such that American military forces would come to the aid of their Australian 
counterparts in the event of the latter being engaged in hostility in South East Asia. See Curran, 
Unholy Fury, 43-45, 101-102 . 
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Chapter One: the Forgotten Sceptic 
 
Despite the United States constituting half of the famous Menzian phrase, ‘the great and 
powerful friends’, public memory of Menzies has been firmly fixated on Menzies’ dealings 
with the other half, Britain. He declared solidarity with the Mother Country in 1939 by his 
famous announcement that ‘Great Britain has declared war upon [Germany] and that, as a 
result, Australia is also at war’, the recording of which still greeted the visitors to the WWII 
collection of Australian War Memorial as the author visited it in early 2017.7 He was the ardent 
royalist who made the Queen Elizabeth II blush with the lavishly emotional downpour ‘I did 
but see her passing by/And yet I love her till I die’, an utterance often invoked today as a 
mockery to Australian conservatives.8 He was a champion of British interests, who welcomed 
Britain’s nuclear tests in Australia and stood staunchly by British prime minister Anthony Eden 
in the ordeal of the Suez Crisis. He was ‘British to the bootstraps’, a quality often associated 
with his disinterest and ignorance towards Australia’s immediate region, Asia.9 
Much of the public debate on the second Menzies Government’s foreign policy remains 
either fixated on the question of his Britishness or fallen prey to simplistic characterisations, 
and sometimes both. His sentimentality and unwise decisions (in hindsight) have led his 
detractors like Paul Keating to claim that Menzies could not ‘separate and distinguish Britain's 
interests from those of Australia’.10 The more radical critic Humphrey McQueen concluded 
                                                 
7 RGM, radio address, September 1939, see ‘Robert Menzies’ entry from ‘Australia’s Prime 
Ministers’ site hosted by National Archives of Australia at 
<http://primeministers.naa.gov.au/primeministers/menzies/in-office.aspx>, accessed on 14 July 2017. 
8 e.g. ‘Tony the Tory really is a loyal royal’, Mark Kenny, Sydney Morning Herald, 27 March 2014. 
9 e.g. ‘The road to war’, letter, Sydney Morning Herald, 17 September 2016. 
10 Paul Keating, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 28 April 1992, 
online source hosted by Parliament of Australia at 
<http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0
;query=Electorate%3ABlaxland%20Content%3ABritain%20Content%3AAustralia%20Content%3As
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that Menzies ‘switched from a British sycophant to American lickspittle’.11 His defenders, on 
the other hand, have  insisted that Britishness was perfectly consistent with an Australian 
identity, and had always asserted Australian interests within the Empire.12 Kevin Perkins’ 
biography brings up the Australia-US relations only by stating that Menzies initially disliked 
ANZUS because of Britain’s exclusion from it, and believed that American commitment to 
Australia was in any case assured.13 More recently Menzies’ management of Australia-US 
relations became increasingly the focus of celebration. Menzies ‘created the ANZUS alliance’ 
binding Australia to a powerful nation made of ‘same kind of people, with the same ideas, with 
the same ideals, with the same high faith’, as Tony Abbott quoted his predecessor. According 
to John Howard, Menzies was ‘faithful to the spirit as well as the letter of that alliance’.14 
According to Anne Henderson, Menzies’ experience of WWII and foresight in the late 1940s 
of America’s role prompted his advocacy of greater interdependence between the US and the 
British Empire.15 The act of embracing the alliance seems to have redeemed Menzies’ 
otherwise unmitigated Anglo-centrism. 
There have been some attempts to deal with Menzies’ America question. Thus Carl 
Bridge situates Menzies’ approach to foreign affairs within a hard-headed ‘liberal/Liberal’ 
tradition of upholding Australian national interest, and committing troops to Vietnam was, as 
Menzies put it, paying ‘a very small insurance premium’ as well as fulfilling Australian 
obligation under SEATO. Bridge concludes that, through the Vietnam War, communism was 
                                                 
eparate%20Content%3Ainterests%20Date%3A28%2F04%2F1992%20Dataset%3Ahansardr,hansardr
80,hansardrIndex;rec=0;resCount=Default>, accessed 13 July 2017. 
11 Humphrey McQueen, Gallipoli to Petrov: Arguing with Australian History (Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 1984), 174 
12 e.g. Josh Frydenberg, ‘Menzies: Australian Pride’, The Australian, 15 August 2014. 
13 Kevin Perkins, Last of the Queen’s Men (Adelaide : Rigby, 1968), 232-234. 
14 Tony Abbott, ‘More freedom central pillar of Liberal Party’, The Australian, 15 October 2014;  
John Howard, ‘The architect of our country as we know it’, The Australian, 20 September 2014. 
15 Anne Henderson, Menzies at War (Sydney: NewSouth, 2014), 207. 
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indeed contained and ANZUS strengthened.16 In John Howard’s recent work, The Menzies Era, 
the development of Australia-US relationship was part of the postwar transformation which 
Menzies presided over. Howard portrays a symbiotic relationship between Australia-US 
alliance and Menzies’ inexhaustible political fortune, from the influence of American material 
culture that suited the Liberal Party’s management of the economy, to security cooperations in 
which Labor often found itself divided and damaged.17 
Howard did elaborate upon Menzies Government’s foreign policy, not least regarding 
the US. Menzies’ approach to the alliance was straightforward, unburdened by Menzies’ 
British outlook—‘such a sentiment [of British association] would not stand in the way of 
[Menzies] following Washington’s lead when the Australian national interest suggested that 
we should’.18 
Yet even in Howard’s own account, dealings with Washington involved more than 
choices on whether to follow its lead. He duly recorded least two occasions in which Menzies 
unsuccessfully sought American support—Australian participation in the Commonwealth 
Strategic Reserve in Malaya and dispute with Indonesia over Western New Guinea19. Nor did 
Anglo-American fallout during the Suez Crisis escape the attention, as Howard noted then vice 
president Nixon’s outlandish rhetoric of American independence in the face of British and 
French imperialism.20 But, as are the cases in Southeast Asia, the book does not probe the 
Menzies’ views on America in view of these events. The closest exposition of Menzies’ 
                                                 
16 Carl Bridge, ‘In the National Interest: Liberal Foreign Relations from Deakin to Howard’, in J.R. 
Nethercote (eds.), Liberalism and the Australian Federation (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2001), 
310-312. 
17 John Howard, The Menzies Era (Sydney, NSW: Harper Collins Publishers Australia, 2014), 9, 307-
311. 
18 ibid., 76. 
19 ibid., 337, 341-342. 
20 ibid., 206. 
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appraisal on the US was probably the claim that that Menzies was not favourable to American 
system of government.21 
The more critical works of conservatives’ management of foreign affairs, especially 
regarding the Australian-American alliance, tend not to distinguish Menzies and the other 
conservative leaders, making them susceptible to overgeneralisation of conservative Australian 
philosophies on foreign policy. In accounts such as Dennis Phillips’ Ambivalent Allies, 
Menzies made appearances only as a figure of performance or ritual, such as when he was 
accorded the diplomatic honour of speaking in the Capitol or announcing the dispatch of 
Australian troops to Vietnam.22 The conservatives’ ideologies, whatever they might be, are 
treated like disembodied ghosts. To be sure, this is not always the case. Michael Sexton’s work 
on Australian involvement in Vietnam War traces the activities of individual officials while 
seeking to demonstrate the convergence between Canberra’s worldview and that of 
Washington. But again, Menzies’ role was confined to that of a domestic politician.23 Rejecting 
his partisan allegiance, Malcolm Fraser’s 2014 book, Dangerous Allies, attacked the right’s 
alleged mindset of dependency on a no longer reliable US. Affirming ANZUS’ utility in the 
past, Fraser unfavourably compared Menzies to Percy Spender who had a more realistic and 
forward-looking approach to Australia-US relations.24 Moving into the 1960s, Menzies simply 
became the first of an entire generation of Australian (Liberal) leaders captive to uncritical 
strategic dependency.25 
 
                                                 
21 ibid., 244. 
22 Dennis Phillips, Ambivalent Allies: Myth and Reality in the Australian-American Relationship 
(Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin Australia, 1988) 127, 143. 
23 Michael Sexton, War for the Asking: Australia’s Vietnam Secrets (Ringwood, Vic. : Penguin 
Australia, 1981), 6, 73-74, 83-84. 
24 Malcolm Fraser, with Cain Roberts, Dangerous Allies (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University 
Press, 2014), 97. 
25 ibid.,145. 
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Unfortunately, the writings of his colleagues do not divulge much on the American question 
either. In the memorial lecture devoted to Menzies, Paul Hasluck, the Defence and then 
External minister in late Menzies Government, offered succinct observations of Menzies’ 
intellectual and leadership qualities, but nothing on Menzies’ thinking on external matters.26 
The bilateral relationship with America (?) was given a passing reference in the book on 
Menzies by John Bunting, the former Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department. While 
little was written on foreign or defence policy, Bunting did, though only briefly, bring up 
Menzies’s dealings with America when discussing his ‘Australianism’. ‘Menzies’s view of 
America was in large degree identical with his view of Britain’, stated Bunting, since Australia 
and the United States shared common history, and ideals. Bunting credited Menzies for 
‘[creating] on behalf of Australia the height of alliance in political philosophy, in values, 
friendship and mutual support that now exists’. It is likely that Bunting did recall the behind-
the-door wrangling between Canberra and Washington regarding the applicability of ANZUS 
over West New Guinea, leading him to conclude with a terse observation, ‘things were civilly 
conducted’.27 
Indeed, the respect that Menzies commanded from his colleagues tends to translate into 
glowing tributes of his leadership, including on the Australia-US relations. Yet such accounts 
often left a sense of disconnect with his Britishness, as exemplified in the memoir of Alexander 
Downer (Sr), a Liberal parliamentarian from 1949 to 1964 and then High Commissioner to 
London. According to Downer, Menzies, being steadfast in supporting his Britain’s cause 
during the Suez crisis, ‘[never] forgave Foster Dulles and Eisenhower for torpedoing the 
negotiation with Nasser’.28 And yet, Menzies was mindful of good communication with 
                                                 
26 ibid., 24. 
27 John Bunting, R.G. Menzies: A Portrait (Sydney, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1988), 201-202. 
28 Alexander Downer, Six Prime Ministers (Melbourne : Hill of Content, 1982), 34. 
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Washington, befriended himself with leading Americans, commanded great respect in the US, 
and ‘foresaw the new forces moulding his country’s future, and urged his countrymen to seize 
them to the national advantage’.29 Percy Joske, a backbencher in Menzies government, devoted 
an entire chapter in his memoir on Menzies to ‘Policy for the Pacific’. According to Joske, 
close cooperation with America was based on not only common interests, but ‘common 
spiritual values’.30 Joske attributed the making of ANZUS to Menzies’ prescience, for he 
‘[realised] that the likelihood of Britain’s military assistance in that area was before long to be 
exceedingly problematical’. Joske believed that, as a result of the treaty, ‘Australia, on a 
government level, moved closer into the United States orbit’.31 This identification of Menzies 
reign with the Australia’s embrace of the US seems to have become a custom; the frictions 
between Canberra and Washington during Menzies’ term tended to be overlooked in such 
accounts, and his private suspicions towards America drowned out in celebrations of a strong 
alliance achieved. 
There was a hint of Menzies’ ambivalence towards the US in the memoir of Percy 
Spender. Having served as External Affairs minister and then ambassador to Washington 
during the period in which ANZUS was being negotiated, Spender confessed that he ‘[had] 
never been able to understand the views of Prime Minister Menzies about this [i.e. ANZUS] at 
the time’. In contrast to his later espousal of the treaty, Menzies in 1950 ‘poured cold water’ 
on his idea of a Pacific defence pact with America. One the one hand, Menzies instructed him 
that in any case, Australia did not need a pact with the US since it was already overwhelmingly 
friendly to and therefore reliable for Australia. At the same time, he ‘described the idea of a 
                                                 
29 ibid., 42-43. 
30 Percy Joske, Sir Robert Menzies, 1894-1978: A New, Informed Memoir (Sydney, NSW: Angus and 
Robertson, 1978), 265. 
31 ibid., 266. 
  14 
Pacific Pact as “a superstructure on a foundation of jelly”’.32 Still, Menzies hereafter remained 
a reliable though seldom mentioned sponsor of Spender’s work in fostering the alliance. The 
contradiction remained unresolved. 
 
The two scholarly biographies on Menzies, by Allan Martin and Judith Brett respectively, were 
both published in the 1990s and reflected the contemporary preoccupation on the question of 
Britishness. Brett’s monograph provides a psychological-cum-intellectual profile of Menzies, 
but for the most part does not explore or examine the Menzian approach to global affairs. Brett 
did point out that Menzies combined anticommunism with the potent and long-established 
Australian geopolitical anxiety, and that Menzies saw mutual obligations between components 
of the superior ‘British race’ as pivotal to the British Empire.33 
On the other hand, Martin’s two-volume biography, which offers a comprehensive and 
mostly chronological narrative of Menzies’ life and career, treats Menzies’ management of the 
Australia-US relationship in detail but relegates it to a relatively minor place in the overall 
scheme of Menzies’ achievements and shortfalls. Tellingly, while Martin pointed out that the 
‘Forgotten People’ radio lecture series drew inspiration from Roosevelt’s ‘Fireside Chats’, the 
analysis focused entirely on Menzies’ articulation of domestic political philosophy.34 
Nonetheless, the biography serves as a reminder of Menzies’ ambivalence towards the US. On 
his first encounter in 1935, this proud Britisher found many aspects of the American society 
repulsive; visiting the US again in 1941, he was disturbed by the isolationist sentiments there. 
                                                 
32 Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy: the ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan (Sydney, NSW: 
Sydney University Press, 1969), 39. 
33 Judith Brett, Robert Menzies’ Forgotten People (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 
2007), 87-88, 115, 120, 127. 
34 ibid., 399-402. 
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Like many of his British conservative colleagues, Menzies retained a deep scepticism, if not 
downright hostility, to the later entry of the US into the both world wars.35  
In some of the earlier studies, this ambivalence towards the US has not always been 
noted. Trevor Reese’s 1969 study claims that ‘[Menzies’] loyalties were unashamedly to the 
Anglo-Saxon world represented by London and Washington, his outlook on the 
Commonwealth had been fashioned in the old imperial school of the 1920s’.36 Seeking to 
affirm the compatibility between the British connection and the American alliance, ‘Menzies 
expounded this theory of the interdependence of the Anglo-Saxon peoples with particular force 
and conviction’.37 While Reese pointed out that ideal of an Anglo-American ‘special 
relationship’ was somewhat deflated when London and Washington clashed during the Suez 
Crisis, that Menzies saw the US as part of the ‘Anglo-Saxon world’ was nonetheless taken for 
granted.38 Alan Watt’s contemporary study of Australian foreign policy similarly stated that 
Menzies saw Australian security within the framework of the British Empire, which required 
close cooperation with the United States, and prioritised relations with the ‘great and powerful 
friends’ over those with Afro-Asian countries.39 Neither Watt nor Reese explored the 
distinction between the UK and the US in Menzies’ worldview. 
To some extent this neglect was understandable because Menzies’ influence in his second 
government’s foreign policy seemed marginal for many. Coral Bell characterised him as a 
passive actor and saw a great irony his handling of foreign policy—being a professed Britisher 
while presiding over policies that ‘sundered the pathways of Australia and Britain’. His 
                                                 
35 Martin, Robert Menzies, vol.1, 164-167, 360-361. 
36 Trevor R. Reese, Australia, New Zealand and the United States: a Survey of International 
Relations, 1941-1968 (London, New York: Oxford University Press, issued under the auspices of the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1969), 82. 
37 ibid., 147-148. 
38 ibid., 190-193. 
39 Alan Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938-1965 (London : Cambridge 
University Press, 1967), 110-111, 308-309. 
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contribution to Australia-US alliance was more in the realms of oratory and ‘an overall 
disposition’ towards closer relationship.40 Tellingly, in Menzies in Peace and War, a collection 
of scholarly essays on various foreign policy priorities of Menzies’ Governments, the roles of 
ministers and public servants dominated the accounts.41 The same could be said of most of the 
historiography concerning the subject.42 
At the very least, though, historians have demonstrated that Menzies appreciated 
America’s strategic importance far less than some of his colleagues. Most of the works where 
Menzies foreign policy role was examined, however, have dealt with this on episodic basis. 
Frank Cain criticised Menzies’ support in 1940 of the Japanese demand that the US close the 
Burma road.43 Allan Martin suggested that the decision by Menzies Government (1939-1941) 
to establish a formal diplomatic representation was due to Washington’s and London’s 
pressure. This was disputed in Norman Harper’s study of Australia-US relations which claimed 
that Menzies was actually considering taking up the post himself.44 Still, Harper recognised 
Menzies’ British loyalty as a potent sentiment, manifesting itself from the issue of reciprocal 
landing rights in 1940 to the Suez Crisis later.45 David Day suggested that, during his first 
prime ministership, Menzies’ dealings with Washington was fundamentally preoccupied with 
                                                 
40 Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: a Study in Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne : Oxford University 
Press, 1988), 44, 67. 
41 Frank Cain eds., Menzies in War and Peace (Frenchs Forest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1997). 
42 e.g. John Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New Zealand 
Diplomacy in the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation, 1961–5 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); 
Gregory Pemberton, All the Way: Australian’s Road to Vietnam, 1958-1986 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 
1987). 
43 Allan Martin, Robert Menzies vol.1, 293; Frank Cain, ‘The Pacific War: Why did the Menzies 
Government Not See it Coming?’  in Menzies in War and Peace (Frenchs Forest, NSW: Allen & 
Unwin, 1997), 7. 
44 Martin, Robert Menzies vol.1 293; Norman Harper, A Great and Powerful Friend: a Study of 
Australian American Relations between 1900 and 1975 (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 
1987), 86-87. 
45 Harper, A Great and Powerful Friend, 66. 
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Britain’s defence at the expense of Australia’s security in the Pacific.46 In addition, Menzies 
deluded himself in believing that America would come to aid Australia should the need arise, 
even though Washington had renounced its responsibility for the naval defence of Australia.47 
Even in the early 1950s, according to Glen Barclay, Menzies was both less interested in military 
cooperation with the US and less willing to challenge its policies compared to figures like Percy 
Spender.48 In fact, as David Goldsworthy noted, there was a profound difference of vision 
between conservative Australians like Menzies and American leaders regarding the post-WWII 
global order: the former tended to consider colonial regimes necessary and effective in 
combating communism and supplementing American power in the Pacific, while Washington 
tended to see European colonialism as a liability.49 
But relations with the US did not always represent a challenge to the cherished Imperial 
ideal. Even if Menzies was less enthusiastic about Australia-US relations than some of his 
colleagues, he did not hesitate to derive benefit from the alliance. Following the established 
strategic traditions, at the start of the Cold War, Menzies once again committed Australia to 
the defence of the Middle East under the Imperial auspices, instead of focusing on Asia.50 
According to David Lowe, the ANZUS Treaty was initially seen by Australian, British, and 
US governments as a bolt on the backdoor to free Australia to participate in Commonwealth 
defence in the Middle East.51 When Britain began to contemplate and conduct decolonisation, 
Menzies again sought to leverage American support to retain British presence in South East 
                                                 
46 David Day, The Great Betrayal: Britain, Australia, and the Onset of the Pacific War 1939-42 
(London : Angus & Robertson, 1988), 58-59. 
47 ibid., 149-150. 
48 Glen St. J. Barclay, Friends in High Places: Australian-American Diplomatic Relations since 1945 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1985), 38, 47-48, 51, 81-82. 
49 David Goldsworthy, Losing the Blanket: Australia and the End of Britain’s Empire (Carlton, 
Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 2002), 23-25. 
50 David Lowe, Menzies and the ‘Great World Struggle’ (Sydney: University of New South Wales 
Press, 1999), 62. 
51 ibid., 96-97. 
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Asia, unsuccessfully. While David Goldsworthy’s monograph on Australian response to 
Britain’s gradual retreat from Asia is concerned mostly with the Canberra-London relationship, 
Washington was also a significant player. American dislike for even the vestige of colonialism, 
preference for Britain’s integration into the European community, and reluctance to provide a 
security guarantee to Australia over its involvement in Commonwealth defence arrangements, 
all combined to undercut Menzies’ efforts to retain British presence in the Asia Pacific region.52 
On several occasions, the coordination between English-speaking nations was more an 
ideal than a fact, thanks to Washington. According to David Lee, during the Quemoy-Matsu 
Crisis, Menzies sought to restrain the belligerence of Eisenhower Administration to avoid a 
break with British policy as well as to minimise the risk of war.53 From the perspective of 
Menzies Government’s effort to obtain atomic weapons, according to Wayne Reynolds, its 
involvement in the Suez Crisis had a distinctly pragmatic calculation of supporting ‘the 
deployment of strategic bombers to defend of Empire communications’.54 This was 
undermined by Eisenhower’s unhelpful intervention against Britain the subsequent Bermuda 
Conference between the US and the UK, which, while restoring Anglo-American relations, 
dashed Menzies’ hope for Australia’s own nuclear arsenal.55 In Richard Chauvel’s study on 
Menzies Government’s experience of West New Guinea dispute, it was pointed out that the 
‘dependency framework’ of the ‘comprehensive alliance’ with the US deprived Australia of 
the ability to impose its own wishes that differs from Washington’s priority; John Subritzky 
pointed out that by 1964 ‘Washington had a de facto veto over Australian force dispositions’ 
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in coordination with the UK to defend Malaysia; but neither investigated in detail Menzies’ 
response to the imbalance of the relationship.56 
If Menzies felt disappointed by Washington over West New Guinea and Konfrontasi, it 
did not prevent him from seeking a closer military cooperation that culminated in the 
dispatching of Australian combat troops to Vietnam. But historians have offered diverging 
explanations for it. According to Pemberton, the desire to secure America’s support over 
Australia’s position vis-a-vis Indonesia was a powerful rationale in Australia’s involvement in 
Vietnam.57 According to Barclay, by offering token forces, ‘[what] Menzies was trying to do 
was simply to buy the best insurance policy possible for his country’, leveraging very limited 
defence resources for a protective shield provided by America.58 Yet Menzies was largely 
absent from both accounts regarding the policy deliberations, with his role again confined to 
being a domestic politician. Peter Edwards assessed that Menzies ‘had done all he could to 
secure that support and maintain that commitment [by the US in Southeast Asia and the 
Southwest Pacific]’ by, above all, ‘[keeping] the relationship with the United States healthy’.59 
Elsewhere, Edwards argued that the fear of America’s ‘selective disregard for certain parts of 
the world’ underpinned Menzies’ and his colleagues’ efforts to ‘lock the United States into 
involvement in the region’.60 This suggests a broader approach than the ‘insurance policy’ over 
Indonesia. Still other works, such as Harper’s survey of Australia-US relations, discussed 
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policy-making surrounding Vietnam with Menzies largely absent; John Murphy’s study, on the 
other hand, is concerned with the domestic politics of Vietnam involvement.61 
Fortunately, there has been some expositions on the intellectual and ideological  
underpinnings of Menzies Government’s (if not entirely Menzies’ own) approach to foreign 
policy. While Frank Bongiorno accepts Coral Bell’s judgement that Menzies was ‘peripheral’ 
to many of the major foreign and defence policy landmarks of his government, Bongiorno 
nonetheless puts great emphasis on ‘[taking] full account of the implications of Menzies’ 
foreign policy for our understanding of the existence of foreign policy “traditions” based on 
the major parties’.62 Although Menzies did not see ANZUS as replacing Australians’ belonging 
to the family of British peoples, this identity ‘did not prevent the Menzies Government from 
embracing economic policies [in relation to the US] detrimental to British and Commonwealth 
interests in the early 1950s’. Bongiorno characterised Menzies’ political language with regard 
to foreign policy as a balancing act between sustaining Britishness and espousing the new 
American alliance. Already in the early 1950s, Australia’s commitment to the defence of the 
Middle East ‘was no longer simply about Australia’s relations with the empire, but her place 
among the English-speaking nations’.63 As the British Empire visibly diminished by the mid 
1960s, the rhetorical and symbolic balance became more clearly plagued nostalgia thus 
increasingly irrelevant. In this account, Menzies himself had relatively little to do with what 
Bongiorno terms the ‘ANZUS legend’—the Liberal Party’s exclusive claim to the fostering of 
the Australia-US alliance that provided a sense of security in the wake of decolonisation.64 
While he might have been correct in identifying a vacuum of meaning which Menzies failed 
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balancing act left behind, Bongiorno and other scholars such as Pemberton would probably 
agree that it was not for lack of trying. After all, Menzies already started deploying the rhetorics 
of Anglo-American community in the 1950s, such as telling the Parliament that ‘it would be 
strange indeed if we, the British people, regarded the citizens of the United States as being in 
a true sense foreigners’.65 
Coral Bell and David McLean teased out of the necessity of Menzies’ balancing act in 
greater detail, although with less emphasis on the influence of Britishness. Bell characterised 
Menzies’ reservation about the alliance as ‘a sensible wariness on his part, or at least an 
intuition that for Australia to move from dependence on two major powers… to dependence 
almost solely on one power was not necessarily a good idea’.66 McLean, on the other hand, 
incorporated into the realist analysis the factor of political cultures. Whereas Americans saw 
their security interests in Asia as arising chiefly from their superpower status, Australian 
security interests was more a result of geopolitical vulnerability; whereas American policies to 
Asia were profoundly influenced by an idealist nationalism emphasising the universality of 
American values and institutions, Australian policies were underpinned by a ‘cautious, flexible, 
and pragmatic spirit of Australian political culture’. This meant that ‘while Australia was more 
exposed than the United States to communist power, the Australian Cold War commitment in 
the 1950s was less rigid and less whole-hearted than that of the United States’. While such 
disparity did create occasional concerns over American policies among Australian leaders, 
circumstances of the 1960s meant that ‘the gap between American rigidity and Australian 
moderation disappeared’. Nonetheless, Australian policy-makers remained determinedly 
pragmatic, as manifested by Australia’s minimalist approach to Vietnam commitment.67 
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According to McLean, this pragmatism was confounded by an equally persistent sense 
of anxiety. For a start, Australians had been looking to this ‘culturally-related power’ for 
protection from an alien and threatening region in which they inescapably situate.68 The 
development of the alliance had its sentimental aspect, arising from Australian assumption of 
‘natural affinity’ with a fellow English-speaking country. But it was a complicated sentiment—
as Menzies’s discomfort with America exemplified, there was a broader Australian suspicion 
towards America as an inexperienced and intellectually superficial, though undoubtedly 
powerful, global actor.69 Indeed, Australian political leaders also tended ‘to see themselves as 
heirs to the accumulated experience and wisdom of the British Commonwealth and to echo 
British doubts about America’s suitability for its new world role’. And because the US was 
‘neither completely alien nor completely familiar’, there existed a ‘state of chronic unease over 
the extent of US commitment to Australian security’.70 The conservatives’ therefore sought to 
‘[build] up credit with US leaders to the point where the obligation on Washington to protect 
Australian security would be unavoidable’.71 
 
As Menzies’ 1935 diary indicates, the affinity towards America as a fellow ‘English-
speaking country’ was by no means a given. The irony which Coral Bell pointed to—that 
Menzies articulated ardently his country’s Britishness while his government gradually steered 
Australia, however reluctantly and slowly, away from the crumbling Empire into America’s 
strategic orbit—can be better understood with an investigation into the intellectual 
underpinnings of Menzian foreign policy, especially regarding the United States. Since 
Menzies epitomised a generation of Australians’ imperial British self-identity, his responses to 
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Australia’s envelopment in its relationship with the US, a half alien and half familiar global 
power, could provide an insight into both the nature of Australian Britishness and the 
conservative ‘tradition’ of Australian foreign policy (or at least the claim of it). Also, if 
Australian leaders of the 1950s and 1960s saw the world predominantly through the lens of the 
‘great and powerful friends’, this study on Menzies’ attitudes towards the US could provide an 
account on how this lens was crafted and refined. In view of the intensity that Australia-US 
alliance seems to have acquired in recent times following the winds of uncertainty which the 
2016 US Presidential Election has generated, the thesis might even offer some timely 
reflections on the assumptions and languages with which Australians have approached the 
alliance.72 
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Chapter Two: ‘where the English names persist’ 
 
In late July 1935, Robert Menzies, then Attorney General in the Lyons Government,  was 
sailing away from his beloved England after the very first encounter with his spiritual ‘home’. 
Biographer Allan Martin commented that it was ‘an experiential discovery of institutions, a 
culture and a people which…he already knew and in the profoundest sense assumed to be his 
own’ [original emphasis], and ultimately a confirmation of his preconceptions of England and 
himself.73 He was now heading towards Canada, from whence he would proceed into the US.  
Menzies confided to his diary that ‘I am as home sick as I can be’. He was ‘chiefly 
catching up arrears of sleep and so avoiding the sound of the harsh Canadian, American accent’. 
The distaste of the US thus began long before he even approached it. Menzies quipped, ‘It is 
difficult to understand the American interest in music; for their monotonous speaking voices 
always suggested to me that they are tone deaf.’ The dislike was, to be sure, coupled with 
certain exotic fascination. While he was ‘disposed to regard my American expedition as an 
irritating delay, there is something of a thrill in going into what is to me a new land, with 
language, ideas, and even physical appearance very different from our own’.74 He could have 
written the same if he were visiting Japan or Argentina. Menzies expected to find in the US a 
different people from his own British race and hence, by default, less civilised. 
Menzies’ impression of Australia’s fellow member of the Empire, Canada, foreshadows 
how unpleasant his encounter with the US was to be. He was disappointed to find that the 
Canadians had become ‘excessively Americanised’.75 In Montreal, his British sensibilities 
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were shocked by a cabaret show, ‘the night life of a great pseudo-American city’, with its 
poorly attired audience and obscene performance.76 He was intrigued to find out that there was 
a rapid increase in French Canadian population, and that they were ‘not pro-France, but pro-
British’, because France had become republican, ‘irreligious’, and had ‘abandoned the old 
feudal ideas.77 If the abandonment of the monarch, traditional social norms, and ‘feudal ideas’ 
saw the disgrace of France, the same judgment would have applied to the US. Yet the distaste 
was as visceral as it was intellectual. On the eve of train journey into America, Menzies again 
complained, ‘I dislike the American accent and blatancy, and want to go home’.78 
 
Still, some aspects of the American society did inspire admiration, especially the 
cityscapes. On the first day in America, he was ‘too dazed by New York to write coherently’ 
in the diary. He enjoyed the ‘really superb architecture of the sky scrapers’ and experienced 
the Empire State Building where he ascended, after three lift journeys, to ‘a turret 1200 feet 
above the footpath and saw all New York like a glittering carpet spreads for miles’. 
Washington, his next stop, was ‘[beautifully] placed on the Potomac, with parks and gardens 
and rives and fine monuments and buildings’. He liked Chicago University because its 
buildings were ‘intelligently modelled on Oxford’, which was ‘a sort of suggestion that 
civilisation is coming’. Chicago’s ‘public buildings are in a lovely soft grey Indiana limestone 
and the Stevens Hotel has 2000 rooms and 2000 baths, so all is well. Quite seriously, the 
Americans are easily the greatest architects.’79 
Menzies’ aesthetic appreciation remained separate from his overall judgements. New 
York’s skyscrapers, however visually striking, were seen as ‘mountains of vanity’, the products 
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of ‘economic absurdity’, because their nearby ‘low buildings and shabby areas…seem to me 
to disprove the assumption that lack of space compels the owners to build up into the sky’. The 
city’s ‘tube railways with their Jews and Wops and the mixed races of the world’ would have 
made a thrilling tourist experience, but it could only highlight the exoticness of the US.80 
Washington failed to redeem America either. Allan Martin, in his biography, noted that 
Menzies was disappointed at the lack of manner in the visitors and the occupants of the 
Capitol,81 but the depth of Menzies’ disgust was even greater. 
The Senate galleries (and big ones too) are crowded, as they are daily in the 
expectation of some theatricalism from Huey Long! When we are there, a 
blind senator with a student voice and a repellent froth like [sic] mouth is 
haranguing empty benches, using the most extravagant language, accusing 
the President of having “betrayed his Christ and his God”, but completely 
unchecked by the deputy President [sic], who sits sucking his thumb and, 
without much trouble I should say, keeping his mind a blank. Apparently you 
can say what you like about anybody. The rules regarding interjections are 
lacklustre…[H]ow any speech even proceeds coherently or even come to an 
end I cannot understand. It seemed to confirm the impression of absurdity 
which the mind receives when it turns from the places of Washington to the 
people who inhabit them.82 
Held firmly in Menzies mind was the image of the United States enjoying superficial, material 
advancement while having a second-rate political and civic culture. It almost seemed a 
mockery of the Westminster system. On the other hand, this proud, traditional Britisher found 
himself having much more respect for the Southern states. Charmed by its cuisine and ‘the soft 
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Southern accent with its accompaniment of friendly good manners’, he even privately quipped, 
‘in some ways it was a pity that the South didn’t win the Civil War’.83 
One could only speculate if Menzies’ enchantment with the South lasted. To him, 
America’s diseases were not exclusively those of its Northeastern metropoles. As his train 
journeyed through the Midwest, Menzies recorded:  
The countryside has many streams, but the farming is not impressive, much 
land being chocked with weeds. Still, these Middle West farmers are 
important, for it is their ignorance of the world and uneducated inappetence 
[sic] to its fate which have, more than any other factor, kept the Monroe 
Doctrine alive and America out of the world responsibility.84 
The supposed simple-mindedness of certain sections of American society, it seemed, 
condemned American politics to its sorry state. America, in Menzies’ eyes, had neither the 
makings of nor the inclination to be a truly world power in the mould of Britain. 
American politicians left a mixed impression. Secretary of State Cordell Hull was 
‘wordy’ and ‘gave an impression of well-meaning ineffectiveness’, and was apparently unable 
to respond ‘when I reminded him that not only had America kept out of the League of Nations, 
but she had also, in the opinion of many, torpedoed the World Economic Conference’. 
Secretary of Commerce Daniel Roper was ‘an elderly philosophic person, given to oratory à 
deux, but attractive in his personality and (like so many Americans) proud of the English 
blood’. President Franklin Roosevelt was ‘a charming man’ and, despite his disability, gave 
‘the impression of considerable physical vigour’ and great self-confidence. Menzies was 
probably impressed and simultaneously perturbed by Roosevelt’s streak of zealotry—‘an 
obvious distaste for the commercial millionaire and a conviction that to destroy the hoarded 
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wealth of a few will benefit the many’, and he was not quite ‘a clean and business-like thinker’. 
Nonetheless, he ‘was honest and sincere, with an instinctive feeling towards the British people 
and Dominions’. American ambassador to the Court of St James,  R.W. Bingham, was ‘a 
charming drawling England loving’ American.85 To Menzies, affiliation to Britain, one way or 
another, was an important measure of the characters he encountered in the US. In the same 
vein, Menzies noted earlier that the Governor of the Bank of Canada was ‘slim and 
elegant…[and] quietly intelligent and English rather than American’.86 The vestige of 
Britishness was a redeeming quality for individuals in North America, and the best of them 
were likeable precisely because they were not characteristically ‘American’. 
This was not an oxymoron to Menzies. His fondness of the Southern culture, however 
superficial, indicates his sympathy with a more traditional version of the US. In the ‘25,000,000 
dollar church yard’ of Manhattan’s Trinity Church, where Alexander Hamilton was buried, 
Menzies pictured that Hamilton’s ‘grand but uneasy spirit broods over the Isaacsons and 
[unclear writing] of degenerate 1935’. In Washington 
[T]he mind goes back to the woods of Old Virginny—the Old Dominion—
where the English names persist and the historical secret lives, and your 
driver speaks familiarly of Braddock and Washington and Robert E. Lee as 
you go through Alexandria along streets which have witnessed the most 
significant things in American history.87 
The true essence of America was its British heritage, and it remained dormant. It was obscured, 
perhaps even overwhelmed by the perversities of the 20th century, but it was not demolished. 
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Indeed, Menzies, with his instinct for institutional, procedural, and parliamentary 
matters, traced the ills of American politics to its very structure. With an Executive detached 
from the Legislature: 
[M]embers of the congress are denied the normal avenues of promotion to 
power and naturally become irresponsible, and both President and ministers 
may very well be innocent of potential knowledge and experience and not 
sufficiently conscious of the practical principles of political action. 
The charm of our British system is that it does realise… that the art of popular 
government is one which has to be learned… and that the best principle 
minister is the man who has graduated to leadership through practical 
experience in the difficult task of reconciling popular desire with financial or 
administrative soundness. The President of America is quite frequently a 
“new chum” with everything to learn of politics in the true sense … In my 
opinion a cardinal error was made in America when it was decided 
(consciously or unconsciously) to depart from that system of a Parliamentary 
executive… For proof of all this, compare the Prime Ministers of England 
during the past 100 years with the American Presidents of the same period. 
The comparison is odious. If Roosevelt had been compelled, on the floor of 
the House, to deal with current political criticism during the past two years, 
he would today be a better President of America.88 
The core of America’s problem, in other words, was not a toxic political culture inherently 
incapable of producing worthy statesmen, but a constitutional mistake in its very foundation. 
This once again testified to the greatness of the British and meant that America’s shortcoming 
would be permanent. 
For Menzies, the United States of the 1930s as a nation that strayed from its British 
heritage and hence its British future. Menzies harsh judgement, expressed in his August 15 
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entry as quoted in the opening of this thesis, was by no means an isolated outburst. Rather, it 
was a summation of America’s ills as he saw it. Having rejected British imperial destiny, 
departed from the best British practices, and abandoned racial purity, America had cocooned 
itself in an indulgence of material aggrandisement. 
 
Seven years later, Menzies was speaking very differently (in public) of America in his 
famous 1942 radio lecture series ‘The Forgotten People’. Menzies had recently been forced to 
resign his Prime Ministership, and Australia was now engaged in a total war with the US as an 
ally. Inspired by Franklin Roosevelt’s ‘Fireside Chats’ and indeed starting by offering his 
interpretation of Roosevelt’s ‘Four Freedoms’, Menzies used his essay to sketch out the 
philosophical foundations for the rejuvenation and reorganisation of non-Labor forces in 
Australian political arena.89 For the most part—and appropriate to the context of the Pacific 
War—the series focused on domestic issues and avoided arguments on specific policies. 
Nevertheless, some of his essays were indicative of his attitudes towards the US at that point 
in time. 
Many of his earlier prejudices seem to have been overturned, or at least appropriately 
concealed. Disputing ‘the old allegation that Americans are intensely commercial’—one which 
he himself expressed in 1935—Menzies contended that ‘we in Australia have our absurd 
aristocracies of money’. In fact, ‘[the] whole atmosphere of the United States is most 
stimulating to anybody who really believes that there is more in life than dollars and that the 
development of the mind is one of the real foundations of progress’. American ‘newspapermen’ 
were ‘conspicuously the best-informed, the quickest and the shrewdest that I have encountered 
anywhere in the world’, and the country had some of the best lawyers, surgeons, and architects. 
The American society was not only materially successful, but produced great professionals and 
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‘great men’, among whom was Cordell Hull, now noted not for wordiness or ineffectiveness 
but for possessing ‘a cutting quality in his mind, which indicate life and vigour’. More 
importantly, he represented an outward-looking America: ‘[in] a decade so characterised all 
over the world by the crudest policies of national self-sufficiency, the existence at the State 
Department in Washington of a liberal and humanist like Cordell Hull has been of the first 
importance’. While the disparity between the impression of ineffectiveness and ‘a cutting 
quality’ of mind was stark, Menzies’ tribute to American generosity that Hull represented was 
probably genuine, given that American GIs were playing a key role in checking Japanese 
military’s drive towards Australia and that the US had been assisting Britain’s war effort even 
before the raid of Pearl Harbour. 
Yet it appears that some of Menzies 1935 assessments continued to exercise a hold in a 
subtle manner. For instance, Menzies described fondly John Gilbert Winant, the US 
ambassador to Britain, that he was ‘not what we call a typical American at all’ in his manners. 
Above all  
We cannot automatically think of the United States any longer as an Anglo-
Saxon community, but we can and do think of it with great pride and 
satisfaction as a community in which the language, the literature, the 
institutions and the ideals of the British people have taken root and flowered. 
America’s non-Anglo-Saxon racial composition was important here, not as a reminder of the 
ravage of the ‘alien invasion of the twentieth century’ (now appropriately referred to as the 
‘vast movements of migration’), but because it meant that Australians could not assume that 
US ‘must either automatically be with us in any world dispute or seem a little queer and 
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uncousinly’.90 In other words, Americans were not part of the family of British peoples and 
should not be held to the same responsibility. 
It would be unfair to say that Menzies’ tributes were an entirely contrived performance 
by an eager politician. His distaste already had softened by his second visit to Washington in 
May 1941— this time as Prime Minister—as part of his unfortunately prolonged overseas trip. 
After an extended sojourn in a battered England, he arrived in Washington on May 9th, when 
the US was still officially neutral from the war. Memories of the first visit had remained fresh. 
The city had ‘[n]oticeably grown’ with its pleasant verdure; Cordell Hull ‘[s]till a bit wordy, 
but absolutely sound on the war’; a bedridden Roosevelt ‘looks older and more tired’.91 
Louisiana’s demagogic politician Huey Long, whose presence so bothered Menzies in his last 
visit and who was assassinated not long afterwards, continued to haunt Washington and this 
Australian visitor with his statue in the Capitol’s Hall of Fame – an encounter, which for 
Menzies ‘induce[d] sober reflections’.92 
The ‘sober reflections’ soon grew into a much deeper and broader ambivalence about the 
American commitment to the war. Earlier, Winston Churchill appeared to Menzies to be 
‘completely certain of America’s full help’; the antipodean Prime Minister registered his 
scepticism in diary, ‘Is he right? I cannot say’.93 While Menzies sensed that the ‘[g]eneral 
American sentiment is on our side’, there was a force of ‘cowardice and short-range self-
interest’ directed by ‘[Herbert] Hoover, [Kendall] Wheeler [and Charles] Lindbergh & Co’. 
Even the pro-British advocacy was using the ‘most imperfect’ slogan of ‘help Britain’, not 
realising that it was ‘[America’s] struggle as well as ours’.94 He felt reassured that Roosevelt’s 
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‘leading ministers’ were ‘for war and nothing less’, but the President himself, ‘trained under 
Woodrow Wilson in the last war, waits for an incident’ which would release him from the 
‘foolish election pledges that “I will keep you out of war”’. Menzies had mused that  
Public opinion is creative only up to a point. After that it must be created by 
decision and action. Roosevelt could decide tomorrow to convoy, and the 
people would back him.95 
Even to himself, Menzies did not make explicit the slight sense of disappointment at the 
perceived apathy of American public and misjudgement of Roosevelt. Regarding the Pacific 
situation, although Roosevelt and Hull had refrained from drawing a red line for Tokyo, 
Menzies felt, somewhat paradoxically, ‘no doubt (without words) that America will not stand 
by & see Australia attacked’ and ‘[did not] think Pacific will be denuded of USA naval 
forces’.96 By August, as Japanese ambition in Southeast Asia became increasingly palpable, 
Menzies finally told Churchill that Washington’s attitude was ‘disappointing’, that ‘a clear and 
unequivocal statement to Japan by the United States would have stopped aggression’. Menzies 
then concluded, vaguely, that ‘if we are prepared to fight America will not in fact desert us’, 
and proceeded to remind Churchill of the reinforcements and deterrents needed in the Far 
East.97 Unsure of American willingness to join the fray, Menzies would not bet Australian 
security on America’s military assistance alone even though it had greater capacity than 
Britain. He sought, as Coral Bell suggested, to rely on both friendly major powers instead of 
one.98 
While in the US, Menzies laboured to shape American opinion for greater involvement 
in the war, deploying a language not of familial solidarity but universalism. Speaking in the 
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National Press Club, he called the conflict in Europe ‘not a struggle for some European political 
problem’ but ‘a battle for humanity’. He repeated this theme in the address next day at 
Australian News and Information Bureau in New York, pleading that ‘our cause, which is your 
cause, cannot be made victorious by half measures’. Whatever the extent his personal rapports 
with Roosevelt and other prominent Americans were, Menzies did not consider Americans to 
be part of the British community, and was candid on that point. He told his American audience 
that he had come to promote ‘the cause of my country and of my race’ [added emphasis], that 
‘[w]e are all different, we all have virtues, and we all have some strange and occasionally 
irritating faults’.99 Menzies was thus speaking not to family but sympathetic outsiders. 
On the other hand, Menzies did aptly invoke American history and heritage that, judging 
from his 1935 diary, he genuinely admired. The US was ‘a country which numbers among its 
makers people like Washington and Hamilton, Madison, Jefferson, Lincoln…a country which 
of all modern nations in the world has been most conspicuously devoted to the pursuit of 
liberty’.100 America had a stake in the war for human freedom because 
If there is one country in the world in which the cause of liberty should need 
no vocal champion, it is this country, which has in its time nurtured some of 
the world’s greatest liberators and through the whole of whose political 
history the idea of liberty as a sacred thing runs like a golden thread.101 
It caused no embarrassment that the first generation of that country’s liberators were those who 
liberated it from the British Empire. Rather, the pursuit of liberty was a common cause for both 
the British peoples and the Americans. Indeed, it was borne out of British legacy. Upon telling 
his audience of London’s affliction under the Blitz, he said 
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Westminster Abbey stood on what were then the marshy banks of the Thames 
very, very early in the history of my race… Westminster Abbey stood 
there…before the American settlement had been established; before 
Australia had been dreamed of… It is a great shrine of liberty in a Nation 
which has the supreme honor in this modern world of ours of being the 
mother of liberty. 
You Americans have an interest in Westminster Hall. You, who have not 
only inherited the tradition of the English common law but who have 
enriched it with some of the greatest legal scholarships that the last century 
can produce… that hall which is the mother of your parliamentary 
institutions, as surely as it is the mother of the Australian parliamentary 
institutions.102 
Although the US did not enjoy a racial or imperial belonging in the British world as Australia 
did, in Menzies mind, it had a claim to the best British traditions in a way similar to Australia. 
By the time he wrote ‘Forgotten People’ series, Menzies’ conception of Anglo-American 
cordiality had gone beyond the realms of history and goodwill. The Lend-Lease scheme was 
produced by Americans’ identification with the cause of the ‘civilized world’ [original 
spelling]; but it also pointed to a more integrated post-war economic order. The payment for 
Lend-Lease ‘is not visualised as a sort of pecuniary rental or purchase price for the goods, but 
is to be found in post-war economic arrangements which will be for the mutual benefit of all 
parties and of the world, and will tend to minimize the acute nationalism which preceded the 
war’.103 The terms of Lend-Lease necessitates ‘far-reaching mutual adjustments of an 
economic kind’ to replace the ‘economic nationalism’ of self-sufficiency which characterised 
Australian war economy.104 The world war had created ‘a world community’, and future peace 
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could be enhanced by ‘ordinary, decent commercial relations…[which] can be restored only 
by the most liberal statesmanship’. In particular, as Menzies reminded his listeners, it entailed 
the curtailing of trade barriers and protective measures in international commerce. While this 
‘permanent new order for the world’ might be desirable in maintaining peace than the 
‘parochial community’ that had gone before, it also aroused Menzies’ conservative wariness—
‘this great lend-lease movement, though for the moment it appears to solve great problems, 
will produce even greater ones’.105 Having experienced, in the 1930s, the strenuous trade 
negotiations between Canberra and London that were often complicated by the imperatives of 
UK-US economic relations, Menzies was understandably circumspect about Washington’s 
intention to effectively weaken the Imperial trade arrangements. He would have also 
remembered the discriminatory policies of the US in that period which so antagonised 
Australian agricultural producers.106 Still, there is little reason to doubt the genuineness of 
Menzies optimism for Australia accruing resources from both the British Empire and the US 
under a more integrated global economy. 
While Menzies endorsed the prescription on trade by Lend-Lease with some unease, he 
was less reserved in incorporating into his philosophy other elements of the Roosevelt 
Administration’s approach to the economy. He rejected ‘old conservative doctrine that the 
function of the State was merely to keep the ring for the combatants’ in favour of ‘seek[ing] to 
control and direct [private enterprise] in the interests of the people as a whole’. The society 
must learn to better ‘attack upon the problem of boom and depression…[and] aim at a proper 
provision of food, clothing and shelter for our citizens’.107 To be sure, Menzies perhaps never 
believed in laissez faire doctrine, since he advocated strongly for a national insurance scheme 
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as the Attorney General in Lyons Government and resigned his portfolio as a protest against 
its rejection in 1939.108 But the success of Roosevelt must have lessened his suspicion of the 
New Deal, as hinted in 1935, and informed his thinking and iteration of a new conservative 
economic policy. 
 
In October 1948, one year prior to his electoral victory, Menzies as the Leader of the 
Liberal Party in opposition visited America for the third time. Roosevelt’s successor, Truman, 
was found to be ‘a charming man of good sense in conversation, and very optimistic’, but his 
public appearance was a ‘flop’. He was ‘sound on the importance of strengthening the British 
Empire’, but most of his aids ‘gave an impression of being second rate’ and the President 
himself had ‘not the competence or background to deal with major international or local 
complications’. Indeed, the Cold War now seemed very tangible with Berlin Blockade starting 
earlier in the year. With the US Presidential Election only weeks away, Truman ‘has been lead 
into a campaign of invoking the somewhat fading shadow of F.D.R., bitterly attacking the 
records of the 80th congress’.109 
It was, in any case, a solace to find sympathetic ears in America regarding the fate of the 
British Empire, even though such sympathy was far from uniform. Earlier, Menzies spoke at 
New York’s University Club about Western Union and British Empire to ‘interested but rather 
unresponsive audience’, concluding that ‘the idea of a Western Federal European union has 
been well sold to the… American people… [that] British Imperial preference is to go!’110 The 
New York Times held similar ‘somewhat academic views’ in favour of Britain joining the 
‘Special European union’; the Pentagon, fortunately, preferred only ‘specific ad hoc 
                                                 
108 Martin, Robert Menzies, vol.1 249-251, 258-262 
109 RGM, Overseas Diary, 15 October 1948, NLA MS 4936/13/397. 
110 Ibid., 7 October 1948. 
  38 
coordinating arrangements’, but even they hoped to have ‘a few quick concrete 
examples…[for] maintaining American public willingness to go on contributing [to rebuilding 
Europe]’.111 Menzies was exasperated at both the Chifley Labour Government—particularly 
External Affairs Minister Herbert Evatt—and MacKenzie King’s Government of Canada for 
their apparent abandonment of the British Empire. An official in Canada’s External Affairs 
Department, who, Menzies believed, fully subscribed to the King/Evatt view, told him that the 
‘Commonwealth agreement is out of date’. Later, the Commonwealth prime ministers’ decision 
to omit the word ‘British’ from ‘British Commonwealth’ caused Menzies much indignation 
and despair: 
Not for the first time, co-ordinated powers and cohesion achieved and 
preserved by brave and self-sacrificing people are being thrown away by 
small minded, career-seeking politicians. I fell very sick about it all, and feel 
more and more that my own ideas are out of touch with the melancholy march 
of events.112 
His experience in London and Ottawa had already created dismay at these American and 
Canadian insiders’ lacklustre attitude towards the Imperial cause.113 In contrast, there was 
clearly a meeting of minds with other Americans such as Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the editor 
of Foreign Affairs magazine, about ‘modern British developments’, on which Menzies was 
asked to contribute an essay.114 Additionally, as was shown above, both Truman and the 
Pentagon were apparently demonstrating greater interest in preserving the Empire compared to 
the sabotaging activities of MacKenzie King and Evatt. 
                                                 
111 Ibid., 14 October 1948. 
112 Ibid., 28 October 1948. 
113 Martin, Robert Menzies, vol.2, 95-96. 
114 RGM, Overseas Diary, 18 October 1948. 
  39 
The US, it seemed, was finally starting to shoulder the responsibilities of a world power. 
‘The old 50% isolationism has gone. There is a new and wide spread sense of world 
responsibility.’ But Menzies’ 1935 impression had not been completely overturned—
Americans’ ‘ideas [were] crude’, and ‘one [was] constantly told that “unless Western Europe 
get together, we cannot continue to assist them”’. The conservative scepticism towards (non-
imperial) multilateral institutions did not square easily with American liberal internationalism. 
Still, Menzies recognised the calculation of enlightened self-interest which dictated that 
Americans were compelled to maintain material support for Europe, since they realise that ‘a 
restored Europe is vital to American security’.115  
It was not quite the case that Menzies simply dismissed American policies with which he 
disagreed as products of their incompetence. That judgement stood in its own right. Earlier, his 
perception of Cordell Hull being ineffective accompanied a respect for Hull’s internationalism. 
Menzies now complained that ‘[Americans’] famous effectiveness regards to machines, not 
men’—another iteration of the perceived disparity between American economic success and 
human development. Nonetheless, interactions with Americans had clearly warmed him in his 
broader attitude. For the first time, this foreign land compared favourably with the Mother 
Country—the ‘air of bustle and energy and optimism here [in America]…is in marked contrast 
to the somewhat listless and apathetic attitudes in England’.116 America no longer offended his 
senses; instead: 
In the trains or planes, people talk to you in an easy and friendly way. “It’s 
been nice to have a little talk with you”. Good manners all round, in shops 
and hotels.117   
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However pleasant the ordinary American was, there were some larger bilateral issues 
plaguing Menzies as well as the Labor Government. Menzies earlier worries about post-war 
adjustments of international trade proved prescient, in a way—it was not American insistence 
on the liberalisation of trade that caused the angst, but rather the opposite. In May 1947, when 
the tariff negotiations in Geneva were halted due to American proposal to increase its tariff on 
wool, Menzies as the Opposition leader moved a motion in the House of Representatives for 
the parliament to ‘express its views [on international trade discussions] while there was still 
time’. Prime Minister Chifley duly criticised the American proposal, and Menzies asserted, 
rather bluntly and boldly 
We are in no position to dictate, but neither is the most powerful country in 
the world. There can be neither peace nor safety even for the greatest without 
mutual adjustment and genuine understanding and co-operation.118 
Again, in early 1948, Menzies warned that the new round of tariff negotiations could ‘destroy’ 
Empire preferences, and that a non-discriminatory trade arrangement could be detrimental to 
Australia. Moreover, such multilateralism focused excessively on the ‘problem of distribution, 
which, according to a common Socialist fallacy, was the major problem’. Menzies also had 
specific misgivings towards the US. The dollar shortage in the British Empire could be solved 
if America was willing to ‘buy more and sell less’; America maintained its right to make 
preferential treatments while demanding the Empire to do otherwise.119 Menzies’ emphasis on 
mutuality echoes his conception of the British Empire which historians have identified. In an 
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organic community, various parties must fulfil their equal mutual obligations and the larger, 
more powerful member was not to dictate the terms of interaction.120 
This instinctual rejection of bargaining based on interests and power, which Menzies 
perceived as parochialism, goes back to his initiation into politics. In his election for Victorian 
Legislative Council in 1928, he deplored ‘the spectacle of small groups bargaining about the 
price of support’. He distrusted the Country Party, with whom his United Australia Party was 
an ally, for their seeming fixation on selfish sectional interest. He even directed ire to the 
businessmen of London who prioritised economic interest over imperial sentiment, confiding 
to his family in 1938, ‘I am increasingly convinced that in London whenever a contest occurs 
between British sentiment and a good business deal, the good business deal wins’.121 This 
framework of the nation and of the empire was similarly applied to the ‘world community’ 
which he spoke of and which included the US. 
 
By the time of his return to prime ministership, Menzies’ views on the US had undergone 
important transformations, though by no means complete. There were three major themes to 
his perception. Firstly, Americans were not part of the British racial-imperial community but a 
foreign country, which Menzies acknowledged candidly. Over time, the sense of alienness and 
distaste wore thin, and the redeeming quality of the English heritage seemed to prevail and 
manifest in individual Americans. Of course, the ‘original sin’ of rejecting Britain still had 
repercussions as embodied by the US political system. Secondly, with its political system being 
deficient and culture degraded, America policy makers tended to be inadequate to their 
newfound global leadership shared with the British Empire. Americans’ economic success 
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overshadowed their naivety in international affairs. Finally, the United States might be more 
prone to parochial concerns as a global power than Britain. Having only recently cast off its 
isolationist yoke, it had not been entirely consistent with the ideal of openness that Roosevelt 
Administration’s Lend-Lease scheme professed, and sought to impose American ideas upon 
Europe and the British Empire. For all its goodwill, the United States might yet come to disrupt 
Menzies’ familiar and cherished imperial world. 
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Chapter Three: a “high destiny” for “Monarchists manqués” 
 
Menzies was renowned for his oratory charm, which he applied to foreign audience as 
well as Australian. In June 1960, upon receiving an honorary degree from Harvard University, 
he spoke on the Australia-US relations and American foreign policy. After the classic Menzian 
witty observations and the obligatory acknowledgements, he continued on: 
You have honoured me by asking me to speak. I would not like to 
acknowledge that honour by offering you the commonplaces of that escapist 
piety of sentiment which characterises after-dinner oratory. You know what 
I mean—most of you have suffered from it; I have practiced it [laughter and 
applause]. And because I want to avoided that, I do not want to say to you 
that “we are cousins” because, quite demonstrably, we are not; we get on 
much too well for that [laughter].122 
This is a rare touch of self-consciousness in political showmanship. It was a rebelliously candid 
yet friendly exposition of his persistent idea—that Americans were not a member of the British 
family. Humour provided a healthy release for the tension arising between this preoccupation 
and the imperative of articulating a sense of affinity; it also served to circumvent the 
implications of the non-familial basis of the alliance, returning to a (less sentimentalist) 
escapism. 
When searching for the inner logics of Menzies’ rhetorics about the alliance, one must 
consider the escapism that he confessed. Being in the profession of balancing disparate, often 
conflicting imperatives, politicians inevitably—despite their intentions—produce 
inconsistencies in their pronouncements from time to time; skilful ones like Menzies could, 
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more often than not, buttress themselves in certain semantic ambiguity. When Menzies said in 
1955 that British people could not really consider Americans ‘foreigners’, it was a sufficiently 
vague term to simultaneously embrace possibility of a shared community of interest and values, 
emphasis a sense of Imperial-American solidarity, and yet stay true to his original feeling that 
America was not of the British race. Indeed, Menzies merely pointed to the strong resemblance 
in the ‘character[s] of life’ between two peoples, rather than a bond of kinship.123 On an 
occasion where cordiality was assured, such as when addressing the Pilgrims Society—an 
organisation devoted to British-American unity—Menzies did not hesitate to elucidate his 
position. 
In the nineteenth century Great Britain…had about her all her colonies, her 
own dominions, as they grew to be; in the twentieth century Great Britain has 
about her countries like my own, British, as British as they could be…still 
believing as I do, and as I have said time after time, that we are one people.124 
Australia belonged, first and foremost, to a global British community; there was no pretension 
that Americans were part of it. Likewise, speaking to the Ditchley Foundation (a similarly 
purposed organisation) in Britain more than a decade later, he asserted the importance of the 
relations among ‘English-speaking peoples’ which he would ‘compendiously describe as 
“British” and the United States of America’.125 Even as a guest to the White House, Menzies 
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emphasised that Australia was ‘a British country’, and ‘I myself am British’.126 Rhetorics had 
to be generally consistent with the statesman’s innermost sentiments. 
 
Nevertheless, British identity did provide a meaningful convergence of identity between 
Menzies and American foreign policy makers. Menzies’ search for Britishness among 
Americans was in a way reciprocal. As Michael H. Hunt points out, a close identification with 
the British was imprinted in American foreign policy ideologies. Hunt used the term ‘Anglo-
Saxonism’ to describe the belief in the essential oneness of Americans and British and the 
resulting conceptualisation of a ‘trans-Atlantic community’. Such beliefs had always, with 
some deliberate reinforcement, enjoyed popular support since the War of Independence. But 
the development of ‘scientific’ racial thinking and the reaction towards mass migration in the 
late nineteenth century sharpened the Anglo-Saxon self-identity among an influential section 
of the United States—the predominantly wealthy, urban, Protestant, East Coast inhabitants 
with British ancestry and often personal connections to Britain. It was from them that foreign 
policy theorists and practitioners of both Democrat and Republican parties predominantly 
came. Many indeed admired Britain’s imperial achievement and believed that, being equally 
noble in blood (among the elites, at least), America would one day surpass Britain’s 
achievements.127 Menzies’ 1935 impression of Anglophile elites’ ‘jealousy’ of the British 
Empire was perhaps not too wide off the mark. It is worth pointing out, however, that Menzies’ 
Anglo-Saxonism was in many ways a circumscribed version. Recalling his Scottish ancestry, 
he punned that 
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I think I ought to begin by saying to you that I am not an “Angle”. I lost my 
angles long since. Nor am I a Saxon. In fact, I am pure Celt, born in 
Australia.128 
More tellingly, Menzies showed only contempt for the ‘cowardice and short-range self-
interest’ of Charles Lindbergh, whose objection to American intervention against Nazi 
Germany predicated, by no small part, upon Germans’ membership in the Anglo-Saxon race.129 
Menzies seemed to have no appetite for the Aryanist interpretation of Anglo-Saxonism. Recall, 
too, that Menzies appealed to Americans in 1941 not on the basis of supposed racial solidarity 
but of a common commitment to ‘liberty’.130 Even though Menzies attached much importance 
to the racial composition of the US, the British ancestry of the elites was not a sufficient 
qualifier for solidarity; what also mattered was a political orientation towards world 
responsibility and adherence to parliamentary democracies—above all the willingness to 
support the cause of the British Empire. By emerging from a pathetic isolationism in the early 
1940s and committing themselves to establishing and maintaining a new international order, 
American political elites redeemed what was left of the country’s British connection. 
But the British Empire itself was now falling apart. In the 1950s he could still proudly 
claim that, unlike other international forums, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ conference 
would ‘begin with understanding’, and their discussions were ‘not to reduce that understanding 
to written terms, but to enlarge it and deepen a friendship which already exists’.131 Within 
several years, decolonisation had drastically changed the dynamics of the Commonwealth by 
bringing into it nation-states that were once colonies. While Menzies understood the imperative 
of channelling nationalism away from communist movements and acquiesced with it, he was 
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still troubled by the speed at which decolonisation proceeded, especially because, by late 1961, 
the traditional ‘Crown Commonwealth’ members had become far outnumbered in the 
association. This culminated in South Africa’s forced exit from the Commonwealth—so much 
for the Commonwealth as a forum of familial understanding and cooperation.132 In a post-
retirement speech, Menzies offered a gloomy appraisal of what the state of the Commonwealth. 
‘[S]ince 1948, the structure and the character have been completely changed.’ A common 
allegiance to the Crown had ceased to be the ‘structural bond’ for most of the members; the 
principle that the dominions were ‘autonomous communities’—especially regarding internal 
affairs—had been ‘abandoned under the pressure of some of the newer members of the 
Commonwealth’. The expulsion of South Africa from the organisation ‘sound[ed] the death-
knell of the old Commonwealth conception’; and ‘common policy on any controversial matter 
seems to be impossible’. In short, ‘The British Commonwealth is no longer British…[but] 
devotes more and more attention to its elements of discord.’133 
Menzies was to find solace where he would not have expected in the 1930s. Already in 
April 1962, Menzies made explicit to British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan his scepticism 
towards a new Commonwealth crowded with newly independent countries of the ‘coloured’ 
peoples. The purpose of the community had been undermined, since ‘the cry of “anti-
colonialism” seems to be the raison d’être of nationalism’ for the new members; the British 
traditions were no longer respected as those regimes were mostly ‘ruthless dictatorship’ or 
‘neo-Marxist’ and constantly threatened to ally with the Moscow; the Commonwealth had 
abandoned allegiance to the Crown as a requisite for membership.  
People like me are too royalist at heart to live comfortably in a nest of 
republics. And “old” republic, like the United States, seems different. Some 
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of my American friends seem to be Monarchists manqués [sic]. They love 
titles, such as those of “Ambassador”, or “Governor”, or “Colonel”, which, 
by social practice, endure. They have their own hierarchical ideas. But the 
new republics seems to thrive on antagonism. In the depths of our being, we 
have little or nothing in common with them.134 
It is useful to recall that, in 1935, Menzies observed that France had lost its appeal to French 
Canadians because it was ‘a republic’, ‘irreligious’, and had jettisoned ‘feudal ideas’, and now 
the average Commonwealth member seemed just the same. The US, on the other hand, was 
rediscovered as a refuge of those treasured ideals. Praising Anglophilic American elites as 
‘failed monarchists’ might seem patronising, but in Menzies’ worldview that made them far 
more preferable to the motley collection of countries in the Commonwealth. American elites, 
in this assessment, had redeemed the country’s original sin of rebellion by fostering the British 
spirit of deference and harmony. Judith Brett, borrowing notions from social theorists, has 
argued that Menzies conceived of the Crown as the centre of social unity and the associated 
rituals as tapestry for an integrated society.135 Being ‘Monarchists manqués’, those Americans 
elites were perceived as inhabitants of the same spiritual and ontological universe as the British 
peoples, even though they differed on particularities of symbols and practices. 
In other words, even as Menzies was grappling with the increasing irrelevance of the 
Empire entailed by the coming of the ‘new Commonwealth’, he came to recognise the United 
States, which had displaced British Empire’s influence, as a carrier for those familiar ideals 
that once defined the Empire. The embrace of America was thus firmly grounded in his British 
standards. The stubborn British-centrism was also visible in his tribute to Franklin Roosevelt 
in his memoir, Afternoon Light. By shaping American public opinion and leading them out of 
isolationism,  
                                                 
134 RGM to MacMillan, NLA MS 4936/574/25, 18 April 1962. 
135 Judith Brett, Robert Menzies’ Forgotten People, 123-124. 
  49 
…Roosevelt has become, in a true sense, a great figure in British history. His 
statue stands in Grosvenor Square, in London. He is no ‘foreigner’ to the 
British people.136 
Dissatisfied as he was with the ‘escapist piety of sentiment’, Menzies sought to establish 
even deeper historical connections between America and the British world. In a memorial 
address dedicated to Thomas Jefferson on Independence Day in 1963, the imagery of the ‘old 
Virginny’ was again conjured up and now put on display 
Mr. Jefferson was a vastly civilised man, with the roots of his learning and 
philosophy deep in the soil of the old world. Virginia itself was a 
characteristically English community in many essentials. The colonies 
themselves felt no sense of quarrel with the people of Britain.137 
Again, civilisation in America could claim direct lineage to the Old World, to the English 
traditions, through one of the most important Founding Fathers. If Menzies in 1935 doubted 
whether the English essence could be revived in the US, the scepticism had dissipated by now. 
The act of independence was, instead of a fratricidal revolution, merely an affirmation of the 
Founding Fathers’ true Englishness against bureaucratic inadequacy 
[W]hen the need arose, they took up arms and by declaration, severed their 
ties with their mother country. Here was no war for territory… no ideological 
war in the sense in which we now understand that expression. It was simply 
a battle for freedom, fought in fact against an unimaginative government in 
London and British soldiers and mercenaries in America, though in form, 
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(ironically enough) against the people of Britain, whose record in the 
achievement and defence of freedom was and is so long and honourable.138 
In this account, the national histories of the US and Britain were united by the common ideal 
of ‘freedom’; the anti-imperial and nationalist implications of the American Revolution were 
conveniently brushed aside. 
 
The rhetorics of shared history also had a prospective implication. Presiding over a period 
of rapid population growth in Australia, Menzies repeatedly drew parallels with the American 
experience. Acknowledging the honour as the Prime Minister of a small nation to be invited to 
Monticello and give the 1963 Jefferson memorial speech, he reminded his audience that 
Thomas Jefferson himself ‘presided over the destiny of a nation with only half of the present 
population of Australia’.139 He reiterated this point, quite fittingly, at the opening of an 
Australian trade display in Los Angeles in late 1966, promising that Australia ‘will not remain 
where we are’, but would ‘in the days of my great grandchildren…be a Nation of 40 or 50 
million people, and therefore a considerable power in its own right’.140 
Rapid population growth meant another commonality between the two countries—mass 
immigration. As noted early in the thesis, Menzies had originally identified the ‘alien invasion 
of the twentieth century’ as a destructive influence on American society, but had appropriately 
backtracked from that judgment in his ‘Forgotten People’ series. Speaking to an American 
audience as a private citizen soon after retirement, Menzies indirectly addressed his (and his 
generation’s) earlier prejudice: 
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When I was a small boy in the country I became accustomed to hearing 
America described as the melting pot of Europe—this was said in a rather 
patronizing way…Fears used to be expressed by the old and the cautious that 
the result of the melting pot might be somewhat indigestible. But, as it 
happened, you, drawing refreshment from all sources, have become not only 
a nation of vigor and of achievement, but…the greatest power in the modern 
world.141 
The mass non-British immigration might not be detrimental to national character after all, and 
American experience seemed to have given Menzies certain reassurance about the future of 
Britishness. In fact, by the late 1960s, there was almost a sense of resignation in his attitude to 
the changing ethnic composition of Australia. Responding to an interviewer’s suggestion that 
Australia might come to see itself aligning better with the US than with Britain, Menzies 
maintained that affection to the Mother Country still dominated in Australia and will remain 
so for long, but ‘as the percentage of non-British people by origin increases through 
immigration that will cease to be an overwhelming sentiment’.142 This was a remarkable 
admission from a man who was devoted to the preservation of Australia’s British ties and 
remembered as a personification of those overwhelming sentiments. The United States 
embodied a vision of Australia’s future as ‘a considerable power in its own right’ through, 
among other things, immigration. While this future was still a slightly alien one, it also seemed 
inevitable. 
Although Menzies could come to terms with European immigration, the ‘melting pot’ 
did not seem enough to incorporate the non-Europeans. Defending the ‘White Australia 
Policy’, he emphasised the importance of maintaining ‘a homogeneous society’, and stated 
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I wouldn’t want to reproduce in Australia the problems of the United States 
of America, as yet completely unsolved and giving rise to the most terrible 
recriminations.143 
The case of America was therefore taken simultaneously as a hopeful example, and as a 
cautionary tale with regard to the existence of non-European ethnicities in a ‘White’ society. 
Having arrived in the US in late 1966, at the height of the Civil Rights Movement, Menzies 
observed American impact of racial issues up close. Sharing with his daughter insights to the 
US 1966 Midterm Election, he perceived a strong ‘White Backlash’ against Lyndon Johnson 
Administration’s civil rights legislations, galvanised by ‘Negro riots and turbulent 
demonstrations’. This might well have revived his discomfort with the presence of the ‘mixed 
races of the world’ on New York’s tube railway three decades ago.144 Commenting on Robert 
Kennedy’s ‘forays into South Africa…designed to develop his American “image” as a “liberal” 
on race problems’: 
I still find it fascinating to observe how many leading Americans find it 
possible, and politically profitable, to moralise about race problems in other 
countries while having, at their domestic doorsteps, perhaps the greatest 
unsolved and bitter racial problems in the world.145  
The perceived hypocrisy by some ‘liberals’, in the face of America’s intractable racial 
problems, cast a shadow on its credibility. Significantly, however, Menzies’ suspicion was no 
longer energised by a fear of American isolationism, but directed towards the perceived 
absurdities in the activist ‘liberal’ impulse. 
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Generally speaking, Menzies welcomed an assertive global stance by the United States. 
Lend-Lease, overseas military operations during WWII and after, and the Marshal Plan would 
have been enough to overturn the initial impression of Americans selfish materialism and 
‘washing their hands of world responsibility’. Visiting the US shortly after the beginning of 
American intervention in the Korean War, he declared emphatically that, by its actions in the 
United Nations and President Truman’s ‘epoch-making declaration’, ‘the United States has 
accepted a world leadership which aptly corresponds to her military power and to her moral 
and physical resources’.146 Stressing the importance of unison between the Commonwealth and 
the US over the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, he pointed to the latter’s ‘supremacy in industrial 
power, her vast population, her intellectual and moral influence’ that made it ‘vital to the 
existence of the free world’.147  
But, having had a taste of American isolationism in the 1930s, Menzies did not see any 
inevitability in the US becoming a pillar for the ‘free world’. Not long after ANZUS was 
negotiated, it became clear to the Menzies Government that Washington did not desire a 
‘regional security system’ in South East Asia with the similar guarantee of common military 
action as the North Atlantic Treaty, because the Americans reluctant to commit ground troops 
there.148 Reflecting on recent American history in 1955, Menzies commented that, as the US 
becoming ‘the great and dominating power in the world’ in the twentieth century, its ‘men of 
imagination and sense’ faced a ‘great problem’: 
Would the United States of America become a great power withdrawn from 
the affairs of the world, or would it become a great power accepting the price 
                                                 
146 RGM, broadcast address on CBS, NLA MS 4936/326/‘Overseas visits, U.S. 1950’. 
147 RGM, speech to the House of Representatives, 20 April 1955. 
148 David Lee, ‘Australia, the British commonwealth, and the United States, 1950–1953’, The Journal 
of Imperial and Commonwealth History 20, no.3 (1995), 460. 
  54 
of power, which is responsibility and understanding of other people in the 
world? And to me the great revolution in the world in the last quarter of a 
century has been that this marvelous country has not only taken its power and 
made its power, but has accepted its responsibility with a humanity and a 
generosity and a warmth of understanding which I believe are not to be 
surpassed in human history.149 
This ‘revolution’, however, did not entirely obliterate the threat of isolationism. 
Commenting on American intervention in Vietnam, a retired Menzies let slip this fear: ‘I think 
one of her great things is involved in Vietnam because let us remember, that between the wars, 
America had subsided into a sort of isolationism’.150 Even after his retirement, Menzies could 
still find ‘some very distinguished people in [American] newspapers of late who seem to think 
that the idea of responsibility matching power is a little out-dated’; or to put it more bluntly, 
‘one can see many traces of [isolationist tendency] still’.151 Responsible engagement seemed 
no more natural to American thinking than isolationism, and understandably so—by their long 
exclusion from the British imperial world, Americans had been unfamiliar with the imperial 
cause. Hence it was only by the conscious efforts of its leaders that the country became a major 
contributor to world affairs, developing a ‘sense of Imperial destiny’ which Menzies thought it 
lacked in 1935.152 This had to be vigilantly maintained. 
‘Imperial’ was very much a core to his conception of the emerging American global 
leadership. In his speech to the Pilgrims Society, Menzies juxtaposed the achievement of the 
British Empire with the subsequent rise of the US and its acceptance of world responsibility.153 
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Its ‘intellectual and moral influence’ that Menzies spoke of were qualities for a sophisticated 
role.154 In his 1960 speech at Harvard, the parallel between benign British imperialism and 
American global leadership was drawn in highly explicit terms, with a quote from Alfred 
Tennyson: 
 We sailed wherever ships could sail 
  We founded many a mighty state; 
 Pray God our greatness may not fail 
  For craven fear of being great! 
This was no imperialist tub-thumping. It was brilliantly perceptive. It saw 
clearly that greatness imposes responsibilities: that power which is merely 
enjoyed is a menace, but that power with responsibility can be the salvation 
of the world.155 
While explicitly denying that his ideal of ‘world responsibility’ was imperialist, he had to resort 
to such familiar imagery of Pax Britannica and the colonial ventures as illustrations of this 
ideal. For a country in the United States’ position, the only alternative to selfish isolationism 
was the ‘Imperial destiny’. 
For Menzies, bearing ‘power with responsibility’ was ‘not philanthropy, but wisdom’. A 
large part of it consisted of improving the conditions for those often impoverished new nations. 
Reflecting particularly on the birth of new nation-states in Africa, he challenged his Harvard 
audience: 
Are we to be just kind to them, giving to them that which we feel we can 
comfortably afford, the “crumbs from the rich man’s table”, or will we see in 
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their emergence a great challenge to the wisdom of western civilisation? Is 
there not a wise-self-interest to serve, not a narrow selfishness for self-
protection, but a self-interest based upon the understanding that our own 
freedom is dependent upon the freedom of others: that we cannot have peace 
and prosperity for ourselves alone?156 
He further warned the audience that, ‘nationally [sic] speaking, the gap between the “haves” 
and the “have nots” is becoming greater’. The new nations, often lacking the means to kick-
star industrialisation, must be assisted, ‘even though it means we do a little less for 
ourselves’.157 He repeated this plea when discussing the prospects of a closer economic 
cooperation among ‘English-speaking nations’: 
If they could strengthen their lateral associations…they would not only 
increase their own strengths…but they could do great things for the 
development of what we call the “new world”… 
World commodity agreements, designed to assure reasonable access to the 
markets of the established and advanced nations…are in my opinion essential 
to the future of world peace. The gap between those who have and those who 
have not must…by all sensible means, be reduced.158 
 His imperialist credential aside, those words would make him a quintessential ‘liberal’ 
on international affairs in today’s political lexicon. True to his faith in the benign nature of 
Imperialism, there was a pronounced moral aspect to Menzies’ vision for America 
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[Y]our high destiny is to use your strength to give light and leading and 
encouragement to the world. The measure of how you fulfil that destiny will 
be the measure of your greatness.159 
Attempts to keep the power and wealth to oneself was destined to fail. But a responsible power, 
though exhausting itself in fulfilling its noble duty, achieves a certain ‘immortality’: 
For a great nation without a sense of purpose will not remain great very 
long…What it gives to the world will be the true measure of its greatness. 
Never fall into the error of thinking or speaking patronizingly of Britain and 
her now disappearing Empire for…the best elements and institutions in these 
new nations [emerging from old colonies] have been derived from their 
former masters, there is a species of immortality about good things.160 
Contenting with the argument that America should not follow Britain’s example to become 
‘the world’s gendarme’ and draw upon itself jealousy and conflict, Menzies again pointed to 
the enduring, ‘living inheritance’ of British Empire.161 
But ‘[p]ower exacts its own reactions’. Just like ‘the world power of the British in the 
19th century…did not purchase popularity’, it was not surprising that ‘the superb American 
International generosity of recent years has so frequently been received with such covert 
resentment or open hostility’.162 Again, comparing British experience with contemporary 
American circumstances, Menzies lamented that ‘great gifts to other nations don’t buy 
friendship’.163 Sometimes, even the possession of such power elicit hostility. When Britain was 
the greatest power in the world, with its industries and control of the sea, ‘[l]ike all great powers 
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in history she inspired jealousies and, occasionally hatreds. You’ve experienced some of these, 
haven’t you, since you became the greatest industrial and military power in the world?’.164 The 
United States should take the oppositions in its stride. 
Britain’s imperial history thus illuminated the United States’ present and future: this 
‘great and civilised power’ must discharge its responsibilities ‘with a real vision of what the 
world needs’ and ‘patience and tolerance’ despite the ‘selfish objections in various quarters’.165 
Because Menzies believed this inherited ‘world responsibility’ to be altruistic and almost an 
expression of natural law, opposition to its fulfilment could originate from nothing else but 
jealousy or selfishness. It is also difficult to avoid the impression that Menzies, seeing himself 
as an Imperial statesman of some standing, was inducting the US to what used to be Britain’s 
mantle. 
The dynamics within the Empire—in its original, uncorrupted form—was to be 
replicated in a British-American community. Back when Commonwealth still seemed 
functional, Menzies remarked that 
[The] Prime Ministers’ Conferences [is] one of the most marvelous things in 
the world for seven or eight or nine men from all around the seven seas to sit 
down together…with peoples of different colors, with peoples of different 
remote historical cultures…to meet as heads of governments and to talk to 
each other, to argue with each other…but always as friends, exposing their 
differences, seeking their unities, but always refreshing their common faith 
in the great things that move men and women all over the world. If only we 
could extend this, if only we could feel that every now and then all these 
Prime Ministers could sit down with their American counterparts…as men 
and as brothers with the greatest responsibility among them for the peace and 
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good living of mankind that any group of people have ever had since the 
world began.166 
The conduct of imperial affairs thus provided a template for the relations between British 
countries and the US. If a group as diverse as the Commonwealth could achieve such 
cooperation, so could it be with the US. As mentioned above, since events in the 1960s would 
devastate his faith in the Commonwealth, this new association involving the United States and 
the ‘old Commonwealth’ countries must have seemed the more desirable, maybe even the only 
alternative. 
As he staunchly believed that the imperial (and national) unity could not be divided into 
the narrow, often conflicting interests of its various components, Menzies also believed that 
differences between the British countries and the US were merely superficial.167 ‘We of the 
Democratic world try to follow the Democratic line, but the Democratic line is not one line but 
three hundred.’ And the differences, often no more than of deviant individual opinions, were 
too easily exaggerated under the logic of the ‘newspaper world’, creating petty 
misunderstandings.168 Menzies resorted to this argument when being asked in the Parliament 
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about the disagreements between Washington, London and Canberra on the Quemoy-Matsu 
Crisis in 1955.169 This was in the face of significant differences in priorities between 
Washington and London, which Menzies and his colleagues worked strenuously to mitigate 
and keep away from the public.170 The rhetorics of solidarity therefore proved more 
prescriptive than it was descriptive—in his talk with President Eisenhower in March 1955 over 
the matter, Menzies ‘spoke of the moulding and uniting of public opinion as the statesman’s 
major task’.171 Similarly, at the hight of Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation, with Washington 
refusing to interpret ANZUS in an unambiguous manner to support Australian troop 
deployment in Borneo, Menzies still insisted to journalists that his government had ‘no dispute 
or difference with the United States about the ANZUS pact’.172 But papering over policy 
differences with the language of indissoluble solidarity, though perhaps a necessary lubricant 
to the alliance’s functioning, does exact a cost on public understanding. Despite the repeated 
failure by Menzies and his ministers to obtain a firm American guarantee on the Indonesia-
Malaysia Confrontation, by 1964 the majority of the public seemed to believe, incorrectly, that 
the US was certain to assist Australia in the event of an Indonesian attack on Borneo.173 
Only on a friendly, diplomatic occasion involving no substantial references to policies, 
Menzies could half-jokingly claim that, he was ‘always capable of having an argument with an 
American’, though not with the President, but Secretary of State. Indeed,  
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It would be a very poor day when little Australia won’t be able to summon 
up its traditional impudence by looking at the big United States and saying, 
“What do you mean, you big stiff?”174 
Of course, such impudence were best confined to behind-the-door discussions, as he did quite 
respectfully but candidly in a long letter to Eisenhower in the wake of Britain’s humiliation in 
the Suez Crisis. Menzies thought the timing of the ceasefire resolution was poor, explained that 
the UN should not supplant the ‘concurrence and strength of those great powers’, and finished 
the letter saying, ‘you have in the past encouraged me to offer such views as I have and I 
therefore believe that you will clearly understand the feelings of friendship and admiration 
mixed with anxiety’.175 When it came to common action, between friends who ‘both happen to 
believe in exactly the same things’, Menzies claimed emphatically, an unquestioning loyalty 
was necessary: 
It is a good thing, above all other matters, to have friends who are not going 
to resort to questioning when the day of trial comes, but who will be there, 
and there for all purposes of the survival of those things that you stand for 
and that we stand for.176 
 
As this chapter has shown, since retiring to the Lodge in 1949, Menzies continued 
redefining his understanding of the US and his conception of the its role in the world. While 
he grew more comfortable with the country, he remained consistent with the distinction 
between Americans and British peoples. But racial distinction was becoming increasingly 
irrelevant—the strategic, economic, and political ties that gave expression to the racial and 
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historical connections between Australia and Britain were clearly diminishing through the 
1960s, and the British Empire mutated into an increasingly unrecognisable ‘new 
Commonwealth’. In any case, American elites were the spiritual, and frequently by lineage, 
inheritors of British characters and principles. Australia’s migration programme (which also 
diminished the relevance of race) and America’s replacing Britain as the global superpower 
intertwined the histories and the future trajectories of the US and the British world. In view of 
these changes, the alternative community of ‘English-speaking countries’ offered a new sense 
of purpose and security—or, more accurately, a continuation of them. America was to assume 
the noble responsibilities that Britain could no longer bear, to be the major sponsor of 
humanity’s progress, and to develop productive relations with British countries modelling 
those in the formal Empire. Despite its immaturities and inadequacies, America had to become 
the new imperial power—in the best sense of the word as Menzies understood it—in all but 
name.
  63 
Chapter Four: Divergences and Convergences 
 
The United States did not always live up to Menzies’ expectations. Problems with its 
domestic politics could hinder its capability and credibility as the leader of the ‘free world’. He 
told Macmillan in 1959 that he had ‘for a long time felt that [the Americans] are not yet ripe 
for the intellectual and spiritual leadership which many people have assumed that they can 
give’.177 When he stressed the importance of Anglo-American collaboration to the Parliament 
in 1955, he spoke of American ‘intellectual and moral influence’ [author’s emphasis], not 
‘leadership’.178 Race issues of the US and American liberals’ handling of it, as noted in last 
chapter, were blots on his impression; the discord and violence associated with the Civil Rights 
Movement and the Vietnam War protests exacerbated it. Writing to his friend Richard Nixon 
in late 1967, Menzies congratulated his tough stance on law and order. 
The United States is the most powerful country in the world…But apart from 
its physical power, I look to it increasingly for a powerful moral leadership. 
It is, let us agree, a very great democracy; but…I have been troubled at the 
growing confusion between democracy and disorder…179 
Whilst England, as Judith Brett pointed out, could be idealised as ‘the place where all the 
divisions and conflicts of human experience were transcended’, this could not be assumed of 
the United States. Its leadership was therefore less reliable.180 
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Menzies also had misgivings of America’s political culture that was unrelated to the 
unrest of the 1960s. He maintained that the disagreements between British countries and the 
US were largely superficial, and seemed to genuinely believe that the differences in political 
systems played an important role in creating unnecessary misunderstandings. Observing that 
‘you [Americans] have periodic misunderstandings with Britain’, he devoted his lecture in Yale 
Law school to a detailed comparison ‘the method and…machinery’ of the two countries 
governments. In the US Congress’ Committee system, public debate played a significant role 
in policy formulation, which could generate much publicity and presumptive judgements by 
outsiders. The separation of authority in the American system made it fundamentally different 
from the British-Australian system of Responsible Government, and Menzies maintained that 
he had ‘offered these observations in no critical or impertinent sense’.181 Crucially, in 1935 
Menzies regarded the detachment between the Executive and the Legislature were detrimental 
to the quality of American politicians,182 and he might well have continued to see the American 
system with a lingering sense of suspicion. In his account of the Suez Crisis from his memoir, 
the public nature of American policy making proved somewhat problematic. While Menzies 
was negotiating with Egyptian President Nasser, pressuring him with the prospect of Anglo-
French military actions, President Eisenhower publicly stated that his administration was 
‘committed to a peaceful settlement of this dispute, nothing else’, which was ‘all the 
encouragement Nasser needed’. 
[O]ne of the phenomena in American public life, if my many good American 
friends will forgive me for saying so, is the new dominance of Press, Radio, 
and Television. These ‘media’, as they are now called, demand audience and 
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demand answers; and, I regret to say, many American politicians defer to 
them. 
And therefore, at a time when silence would have been golden, the President 
of the United States, by speaking, relieved us of whatever chance—and a 
very slim chance it was—we had of success.183 
This was probably the strongest disapproval of any American policy that Menzies expressed 
openly. Since the public nature of policy-making was entrenched and the dominance of the 
media seemed powerful, there was much reason for him to believe that the potential for 
volatility in American foreign policy would persist.  
Privately, Menzies had doubts about capacity of American political system and practices 
to produce the quality of leadership that the world needed. Observing the US Presidential race 
in 1960, he remarked to his daughter that Eisenhower’s suggestion for ‘vote on communism or 
freedom’ was ‘just about the silliest proposal I’ve ever heard of’ and that it would only harm 
Nixon’s prospects.184 He lamented to his friend, Felix Frankfurter, that the new spectacle of 
television reduced debates to fast and unreflective utterances without ‘any indication that any 
mental process was going on at all’; the public ‘mistake fluency for strength and a good 
memory for a wonderful grasp of world affairs’. In particular, the ‘ridiculous and dangerous 
argument about Quemoy’ meant that ‘[e]ach candidate put himself into a position from which, 
if elected, he might well find it essential to retreat before long’. He believed that ‘too much is 
spent on elections, which are therefore dominated by businessman and public relations 
experts…[who] proceed to apply to this most subtle and elusive subject the same principles as 
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they apply to selling Palmolive soap!’ Menzies confessed that he ‘cannot imagine that either 
Nixon or Kennedy will make a great President’, and was ‘deeply depressed about the whole 
matter, because the future of the world, particularly over the next four or five years, will depend 
very largely upon the quality…of the occupant of the White House’.185 
Menzies’ refusal to treat interests as divisible among sections of an organic entity, as 
discussed previously, translated into an absence in both his public and private language about 
the potential divergences in Australian and US interests. In his memoir, Afternoon Light, 
Menzies discussed the differences between America and Australia purely in terms of the system 
of government.186 In reality, the Menzies Government had to deal with the increasingly 
pronounce trade deficit that Australia suffered in its bilateral trade with the US, especially from 
the late 1950s, since the US imposed multiple restrictive measures on Australian exports.187 
Menzies proved much more accomodating of such inequity than his Minister for Trade, the 
abrasive and more nationalist John McEwen, whom Menzies duly restrained.188 This meant 
that security cooperation became where the relationship could be most productive. On this 
front, he did remind his American audience of the differences in geopolitical environment. 
When Americans considered the Cold War, 
you are naturally thinking in terms of western powers and the great 
communist bloc…well we think of it too, in that fashion. But, of course, we 
are, in fact, a country of about your area, lying off the coast of Asia, and we 
are acutely conscious of what goes on in Asia and of the onward march of 
Chinese Communism—not perhaps so easily understood as events in Europe, 
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because it is…within boundaries less well defined and it relates to problems 
of population of a complicated kind which are less well understood.189 
This was a striking parallel with his declaration in 1939 that ‘What Britain called the Far East 
was for Australia the near north’.190 It was more a traditional concern of the great power being 
absorbed in Europe and thus neglecting Asia, but it would have been compounded by his 
concern about American isolationism. 
 
The imperial mindset readily aligned with certain American strategic traditions that were 
established as the country’s foreign policy orthodoxy in the postwar era. Recall Menzies 
encounter with Alexander Hamilton’s tomb in 1935, where Hamilton’s ‘grand but uneasy 
spirit’ seemed all but forgotten by America.191 In contrast to Thomas Jefferson’s reluctance to 
see the US involved in foreign entanglements to the detriment of individual liberty at home, 
Hamilton articulated a vision for America to eventually establish itself as a great power capable 
of dictating “the terms of the connection between the old and the new world”.192 Hamilton’s 
thinking gained greater following after his untimely demise. Throughout the first half of the 
nineteenth century, the Hamiltonian vision assimilated the Jeffersonian dream of liberty to 
produce a powerful, expansive ideology: Americans’ liberty was intricately intertwined with 
national greatness which must find expression in an activist foreign policy to promote liberty 
abroad. By remaking the world in their country’s image, Americans would maintain their 
national character and unity, constantly reinvigorate their faith in liberty, and fulfil their divine 
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obligation as a nation embodying human progress. By the time the US joined the Second World 
War, the interventionists finally secured their position as the keeper of foreign policy 
orthodoxy, and the War served as a stark reminder of the price of passivity. Confronted with 
international Communism, the US under the Truman Administration took upon itself the 
obligation of maintaining an international environment conductive to ‘free institutions’ and 
‘individual liberty’, and the orthodoxy was cemented in the doctrine of containment.193 
According to Hunt, although the American foreign policy establishment remained 
dominated by White Anglo-Saxon Protestant elites after the Second World War, outsiders such 
as Kennedy (an Irish Catholic) were often quickly converted to their new orthodoxy.194 
Menzies’ own memory of Kennedy rather reflected this. He admitted that, through his 
knowledge of Kennedy’s family, ‘it would have been difficult for any American President to 
start, before I knew him, further back in my estimation than John Fitzgerald Kennedy’. During 
his sojourn in London in 1941, Menzies discovered, by word-of-mouth, that the ‘founding 
father’ of the Kennedy family, Joseph, was ‘badly regarded by a beleaguered Britain’ and was 
‘thought to be a defeatist’. In his first meeting with the young President, ‘any prejudice I had 
was not in his favour’. But upon their first meeting, Menzies claimed, Kennedy impressed him 
with a genuine intellectual vigour and eagerness to learn, being a man ‘called to the most 
important office in the world without great experience’. Kennedy ‘made himself an active force 
in world affairs’, and was concerned with everything that concerned Australia—Britain’s 
relations with the European Economic Community, the future of the British Commonwealth, 
and the situation of South East Asia.195 
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 Menzies’ various articulations on the necessity of an activist American stance, best 
encapsulated in the assertion that ‘a great nation without a sense of purpose will not remain 
great very long’, resonated perfectly with postwar American orthodoxy.196 Just as proponents 
of foreign activism incorporated Jeffersonian conceptions of American liberty in their 
ideology, Menzies deliberately reinvented Jefferson, claiming that:  
Mr. Jefferson, though he worked primarily for the liberty of Americans and 
felt no call to impose his views on an older world, would, confronted by the 
problems of the modern world have vastly approved the world defence of 
individual liberty…197 
By conceiving ‘world defence of individual liberty’, Menzies identified with the sense 
universalism that characterised American pursuit of liberty. Both Menzies and American 
leaders had acquired the ‘lesson of Munich’—that appeasement towards an expansionist 
dictator would only feed their appetite for it—and deployed it to the case of Vietnam.198 
Praising American involvement in the Vietnam War, he professed that 
I do not believe for one moment that human freedom is divisible or 
expendable. We must always have in mind the famous words of John Don—
“Never send to find for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.”199 
This was by no means a contrived effort purely for encouraging the Vietnam effort on 
Americans’ own ideological footing. Back in 1960, he was already asserting that Australia’s 
and America’s duty of ‘guiding and assisting other nations and peoples’ was born of the ‘one-
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ness of humanity’. ‘Freedom’ was not the reserve of the West, but ‘for all man, including those 
hundreds of millions in countries moving towards independence’.200 
On the other hand, Menzies’ conservative instinct found resonance with another aspect 
in American foreign policy ideology—what Michael Hunt has termed ‘the nagging 
preoccupation with the perils of revolution’. Through their reflections on American Revolution 
and observations on the upheavals in the next four decades—both in Europe other parts of the 
American Continent—early American leaders became increasingly conscious of the limitations 
of revolutions to successfully produce freedom-loving governments as it had in the US. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, with hopes of American-style revolutions repeatedly 
dashed, there emerged a greater consciousness of revolution’s potential for violence, and the 
capacity for revolution to retain “sanctity of property” and be harnessed for gradual and 
respectable social progress became an important measure, particularly among the Anglo elites. 
Around the turn of the twentieth century, Americans were quick to discern the troubling radical 
tendencies of revolutions and, in some cases, readily intervened against them. Hence, after 
WWII, international Communism became the obvious nemesis of American ideals of freedom 
and human progress.201 The hostility towards revolution also incorporated a degree of Anglo-
Saxonism—the uniqueness of American success seemed to confirm the racial superiority of 
the Anglo-Saxons.202 
Similarly, while Menzies espoused freedom ‘for all man’, his understanding of 
parliamentary democracy predisposed him to the abrupt social change that revolution 
represented. In his first encounter with England, he discovered (or rather, as Judith Brett has 
argued, confirmed) what he deemed an essential truth of the British system of government—
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‘a Parliament for England is no mere result or adoption of a political theory (as it was on the 
Continent) but something grown from the very roots of the English life’.203 The roots of the 
parliamentary institutions ‘were deeply set in the history and character of the British people’. 
But in countries to which it was transplanted, ‘at the first real blast of the storm it fell’ since 
‘[i]t was not really rooted in the soil’.204 Reflecting on the claim by the Declaration of 
Independence that the inalienability of human freedom was a ‘self-evident’ truth, Menzies 
repeated his points to the American audience. And it was intimately linked to wariness against 
not only revolution, but also against the self-determination of colonies. 
We are so utterly familiar with what I will call for my own purpose 
“parliamentary self-government”…that we somehow forget that it has been 
a thing of slow and somewhat painful growth’ that it has come from below, 
and not above. You cannot create a democracy as quickly as you can create 
independence. 
…[Political independence] is, indeed, a beginning, just as capable of 
producing a new tyranny as it is of producing an independent community of 
free men. Indeed, we all know of more than one case, don’t we, in which 
independence has been followed by either chaos or by something singularly 
like dictatorship.205 
Menzies’ instincts manifested in various decolonisation issues that confronted Australia, 
insisting on decolonisation on Western powers’ terms. He strongly favoured continued Dutch 
rule in Indonesia in 1947, supported French rule in Indochina in 1954, and was determined to 
thwart Indonesian claim on Western New Guinea in the early 1960s.206 On the other hand, both 
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Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations, under the strong influence of development theory, 
tended to see Western tutelage as the best path for the peoples of the ‘Third World’, since it 
would acquaint them with modern institutions and values and therefore fast-track them towards 
‘stable and free societies’. Premature independence would condemn a new state to Soviet 
manipulation. Continued Western colonial rule, as well as stable authoritarian regimes headed 
by pro-Western strongmen, were often deemed more desirable than alternatives and thus 
received various degrees of American support.207 To be fair, Menzies appeared more hesitant 
than American leaders to support an authoritarian regime over a revolutionary one—Canberra 
did not extend recognition to the Chiang Kai-shek’s regime in Taiwan until 1966. On the other 
hand, when the ‘natives’ proved less than malleable, there was also a tendency for both Menzies 
and American policy makers to dismiss such resistance as signs of ‘jealousy’ and ‘ingratitude’ 
and incapacity for progress.208 Such resistance was to be expected and must be deter the US 
from selflessly providing protection and guidance.  
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Conclusions 
 
In Australia’s Vietnam policy, Menzies’ hopes and fears for the US expressed most 
conspicuously. Historians such as Pemberton have argued convincingly that Menzies 
Government was more no less eager for an escalation in Vietnam than Washington did, based 
on its own assessment of Australian interest.209 As Menzies himself admitted, Australia itself 
had a greater security stake in Vietnam.210 It would be impossible to deny that considerations 
of ‘national interest’ were deeply involved. But ideologies do exert their influence in framing 
‘interest’ and priorities and in designing corresponding policies. While Australian participation 
of Vietnam War was not merely dictated by the alliance with the US, Menzies perceptions of 
America remained a factor in the Australia-US cooperation in this conflict. The significance of 
the alliance dimension of Australian involvement was not lost to historians. Menzies decided 
to replace Garfield Barwick with Paul Hasluck as the Minister of External Affairs in 1964, with 
Hasluck feeling less inclined to limit Australian military commitment to South East Asia than 
Barwick and giving greater consideration to the alliance.211 For Menzies, the Vietnam War was 
key to cementing an assertive American strategic posture and the associated ‘sense of Imperial 
destiny’—as he called it in 1935. Indeed, American intervention in Vietnam was ‘the greatest 
act of moral courage since Britain stood alone in the Second World War’.212 He emphatically 
declared to the Parliament that 
No sane person could say that American forces are being used in Vietnam for 
the preservation of interests peculiar to America…Clearly, the Americans are 
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there to defend a world order, the defence of which is the prime purpose of 
the creation of the United Nations, and imposes duties upon every member 
nation.213 
In this view, American commitment should not be based on calculations of interest but a 
recognition of its inexorable responsibility to underwrite a ‘world order’ which was being 
challenged by Communist activities in Indochina. The Vietnam War was seen as a test of will 
for the ‘free world’.214 Because of South East Asia’s distance from America, and because of 
the persistence of American innate isolationism, the US needed every encouragement to 
maintain a strong presence in the region. Hence, Menzies was eager to provide support to South 
Vietnam in conjunction with the US, even though Australian resources were already being 
taxed by Indonesian threats on New Guinea and by commitments to the defence of Malaya and 
later Borneo.215 Preferring a gradual social progress under the tutelage of a strong and civilised 
power which would, in time, produce a free society, Menzies could not but support the regimes 
in Saigon, however repressive or ineffective they were.216 
It is probable that, as Peter Edwards claims, Menzies did believe that the United States 
would achieve a military victory in Vietnam.217 But the prospect of the military outcome might 
not have been the chief concern. Since the world order was predicated on great powers—by 
1960s, the US alone—carrying out its responsibility, a greater defeat would have already been 
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incurred on the ‘free world’ if the US refrained from military intervention. Moreover, Menzies’ 
understanding of British imperialism, his acceptance of Britain’s decline, and his exaltations 
of British Empire’s legacy combine to suggest a certain detachment from the balance of means 
and specific security interest in Indochina for Australia and the US. In its days, the British 
Empire fulfilled its duty of promoting progress and keeping peace across the globe. Even 
though the power of the Empire was eroded in this enterprise, the its enduring legacies provided 
the ultimate vindication. Likewise, even if the conflicts in Indochina consume much of 
America’s resources in the long run, American intervention—so long as it was sustained—
could have a lasting impact by fostering stable, free societies with democratic political 
institutions. 
 
Menzies’ perceptions of the United States was intimately intertwined with his 
understanding of Australia’s imperial purpose and identity. To be sure, despite American 
defence of Australia and assistance to Britain in WWII, despite the US eclipsing Britain as the 
dominant power of the ‘free world’, and despite Menzies’ disappointment with the 
Commonwealth, he never considered the United States as part of the British ‘family’—with 
their indissoluble blood ties, expressed in common allegiance to the Crown, formalised in the 
institutions of the Empire and later the Commonwealth, and substantiated by various economic 
and strategic collaborations across the world. It is little wonder that in the early 1950s Menzies 
was opposed to placing the Australian-American Memorial at a more prominent location in 
Canberra—it would have seemed about as appropriate as dedicating a statue to the French 
soldiers who had fallen beside their Australian comrades in the First World War. 
But the relevance of the ‘family’ category diminished during Menzies’ prolonged prime 
ministership. As recent historiography of the 1960s has demonstrated, the trappings of the 
Empire started rapidly unravelling in the last several years of the Menzies Government, and 
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Australia had little control over this development. In terms of trade and security, Britain 
increasingly looked towards Europe; with regard to imperial political associations, former 
colonies were being admitted into the Commonwealth as republics and challenging the 
traditional, British dominions.218 The tightly knit ‘family’, as defined by the shared British 
racial composition, looked increasingly devoid of substance without those additional layers of 
connections. 
The community of ‘English-speaking countries’, which corresponded to the traditional 
American notion of ‘Anglo-Saxonism’, gained relevance for Menzies. While he transferred the 
much of template of the Empire connections onto his understanding of Australia-US relations, 
the bond of kinship was no longer a requisite of solidarity. Menzies started to perceive 
Americans to be sharing the same cultural and moral universe with him—even though, of 
course, he saw this very much through his Britishness lens. Those redemptive qualities of the 
US were already registered during Menzies’ first encounter with America in 1935, and 
gradually come to dominate his image of America, with his subsequent visits and contact with 
political elites favourably disposed towards Britain. Menzies also came to think of British 
peoples and Americans as having intertwined histories and futures. America’s experience, from 
Roosevelt’s New Deal to successful integration of European migrants, informed Menzies’ 
vision for Australia. The cementation of an assertive American strategic posture made the 
global community of ‘English-speaking countries’ a tangible substitute for the intractably 
declining Empire. By 1967, as the UK continued to redirect its resources to Europe, Menzies 
claimed that Britain’s choice was not one between ‘Europe or “the bush”’, but rather ‘Europe 
or the English-speaking world’.219 In the 1960s, then, the United States was no longer perceived 
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as a contender undermining Australia’s ties to Britain but rather an ally in salvaging what was 
left of it, and there was no need for the kind of balancing act between the American alliance 
and British connections that Frank Bongiorno suggested.220 
The transformation of Menzies’ views on the US represented an endeavour to define 
Australia’s post-Imperial (uppercase intended) identity, one that was founded not on explicit 
racial terms but on the footings of culture and political ideals. It was an ‘imperial’ vision 
nonetheless—Australia associating itself closely with a familiar but distant great power, which 
provided certain security assurance not necessarily on Australia specifically, but over its alien 
and threatening region. In its turn, Australia would make its contribution to the common 
enterprise. 
In the context of the Cold War, Menzies’ approach to Australia-US relations could be 
characterised as an extension of what Pemberton termed ‘imperial imagination’— 
‘conceiv[ing] of Australian interests through the prism of the empire’—whereby support for 
the wider, imperial interests was indistinguishable from supporting those of Australia.221 But 
Menzies did not come to see the US as a fully fledged imperial power, and was troubled by 
what he identified as an entrenched isolationist sentiment and the deficiencies of American 
political institutions and practices. The United States had to be continually cultivated in its 
leadership role which could not be taken for granted.  
In Robert Manne’s critique of John Howard’s foreign policy, Manne argues that ‘Howard 
feels attached to the contemporary US in the way his great hero, Sir Robert Menzies, once felt 
attached to the British Empire’. More specifically, Howard saw the United States as a 
civilisation embodying the most desirable virtues and as ‘the only nation that actually has the 
power to change the world for the better’. The twenty-first century was bound to be America’s, 
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and Australia’s best path was to be ‘deeply integrated—strategically, economically, socially 
and culturally—into the most formidable empire the world has ever seen’. Manne draws 
multiple parallels between the sentiments and practices of Menzies regarding the British 
Empire and those of Howard regarding America.222 The present thesis suggests that Menzies 
had already developed a vision of an Australia integrated with the United States. Of course, 
this integration was not based on the bilateral relations (as Manne suggested to be Howard’s 
vision) but on a broader ‘English-speaking world’—a multipolar community through which 
Britain could continue to exercise certain moral leadership and maintain its global presence. 
The ‘English-speaking world’, modelled upon the vision of an organic British Empire 
where reciprocity and mutual accomodation surpassed calculation of parochial self-interest, 
was never completely realised. The United States’ moral leadership remained in question—
symbolically, in 1977 (the year before his passing), Menzies emerged from retirement to 
criticise his personal friend Nixon. In an interview with David Frost earlier, Nixon disclosed 
that Menzies ‘had written him “a very nice note”’ of support for him during Watergate, 
referring to a letter from Menzies in 1973. With details of the scandal now being public 
knowledge, Menzies insisted that ‘personal letters should remain personal forever’.223 Menzies 
would also have felt disappointed by various US administrations’ failure to liberalise American 
trade policies in relation to Australia, as well as their refusals to offer a straightforward security 
guarantee on several occasions. By the time he retired from prime ministership, the new 
‘empire’ was still a work in progress. Menzies’ vision of an organic community was essentially 
a self-fulfilling one—it would dissipate as soon as one party starts to prioritise its own interests 
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above all else. On an ontological as well as a moral level, it was the antithesis of a transactional 
relationship.
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